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INTRODUCTION 
As part of its investigation into New York State government contracting systems, 
the Cornmis.5ion on Government Integrity investigated how one large New York State agency, the 
Division of Substance Abuse Services ("DSAS"), awarded contracts to certain New York City drug 
addiction programs. 1 This report is divided into two parts, the first of which (pp. 7 ,21) sets forth 
the Commission's conclusions from that investigation and its recommendations for reform of 
DSAS' contracting system. The second part (pp. 23,88) sets forth the Commission's factual 
findings that support its conclusions and recommendations. 2 
DSAS is responsible for providing a wide variety of drug education, prevention and 
treatment services.3 The agency funds services such as community and school,based prevention 
programs, drug,free therapeutic treatment programs, and methadone maintenance programs. 
Eighty percent ofDSAS' funds for these services are expended in New York City and Long Island.4 
Like other state social service agencies, DSAS grants funds (either directly or 
through local government agencies) to private service providers, usuaUy·not,for,profit businesses, 
rather than providing the services itself. This method of service delivery, sometimes referred to as 
"contracting out," has become increasingly common as governments have concluded that it 
1 The Commission's investigation began in October 1988 and DSAS employees and officials were first contacted by 
Commission staff in November of that year. 
2 The Commission's investigation and report are predicated upon the Commission's mandate to investigate weaknesses in 
laws, regulations and procedures regarding "the solicitation of government business, permits, franchises, and the like and 
determine whether such weaknesses create an undue potential for corruption, favoritism, undue influence or abuse of official 
position or otherwise impair public confidence in the integrity of government." Executive Order No. 88.l , , 2(4) . 
Recent reports of the Governor's Office of Management and Productivity and the Office of the State Comptroller have also 
discussed DSAS' management problems and have mentioned some, but not all, of the matters discussed in this report. See 
Governor's Office of Management and Productivity, "Division of Substance Abuse Services Local Contracting Process, A 
Management Analysis," September 1989; Office of the State Comptroller Report No. 88-S-57, "Division of Substance Abuse 
Services, Oversight of Community-Based Programs." This report complements those by discussing how management problems 
of specific programs reflect on the integrity of the agency's contracting process. 
3 DSAS is one of two divisions comprising the Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services (the other is the Divi-
sion of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse), which is a component of the N.Y.S. Department of Mental Hygiene. See Mental 
Hygiene Law §§ 5.01 and 19.05(a) . 
4 Armstrong Tr. at 15 (references in this format are to the pages of the private hearing transcript of the witness named) . 
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·-permits a higher quality of services at lower cost. In recent years, state agencies have awarded 
hundreds of millions of dollars to private organizations for a wide array of social services. 5 
The state's obligation to monitor the expenditure of taxpayer funds is not 
diminished simply because it has shifted the service delivery function to private entities. To the 
contrary, because monitoring the quality and cost-effectiveness of an outside contractor's product 
is often more difficult, the government's monitoring obligation is increased. 
In exploring how well one state agency, DSAS, awards funds and monitors 
performance, this investigation focused on four New York City drug-free treatment programs: 
(1) La Nueva Raza Institute ("LNRI"), which has received over $2 million in DSAS 
funding since February 1981 to operate an ambulatory drug-free treatment program in Queens, 
and nearly $974,000 in additional funding from July 1986 to June 1989 for an unsuccessful effort 
to open a residential treatment program, the Young Adults in Transition Center ("YA TC") ; 
(2) Prospect, Inc., a program that received nearly $175,000 in DSAS funding 
between July 1985 and March 1987 in unsuccessful efforts, first, to open a detoxification program 
in The Bronx and then, later, to open a residential drug-free program in East New York, Brooklyn; 
(3) National Expert Care Consultants, Inc. ("NECC"), a for-profit business that 
received over $4 million in DSAS funding between July 1986 and March 1988 to operate both 
outpatient and residential treatment programs in midtown Manhattan; and 
(4) El Regreso, a residential program in Brooklyn that has received over $1 million 
in DSAS funding since July 1986 and has not yet begun operations. 
The contracts with these programs were part of DSAS' effort to expand both the 
number of service providers and the number of residential treatment beds in New York City in 
response to the explosion in drug use in the mid- l 980's. While the funding authorized for these 
programs represents a small portion of the money awarded by DSAS to treatment programs in the 
5 For example, in the three-year period from April 1985 through March 1988, the New York State Department of Health 
approved over 1,500 grants worth almost $370 million; the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental 
Disabilities awarded over 3,000 grants worth almost $360 million; and DSAS awarded 630 grants worth almost $330 million. 
In fiscal year 1989-1990, DSAS' budget for local services is nearly $194 million. 
2 
New York City area,6 the combined funding for the four programs' first contract year represents 
about 40% of the first-year funds awarded to all new treatment providers in the area since 1985. 
6 The value of the contracts awarded to these programs since 1985 (which is somewhat more than the amounts actually 
spent by the programs) is less than $ 10 million, as compared to $467 million awarded to all drug-free treannent programs in 
New York City during the same time period. 
3 
SUMMARY 
DSAS' contracting process in New York City lacks adequate rules and procedures 
necessary to ensure objective evaluation of both proposed and established treatment programs. 
Even those rules that do exist are often rendered meaningless by agency officials, including the 
Director, who tolerate (and sometimes encourage) disregard for rules and lines of authority 
whenever expedient. The result is an ad hoc process vulnerable to subjective decision-making, 
manipulation for personal objectives, and the vicissitudes of personal rivalries. These weaknesses 
have caused the agency to waste its resources, created skepticism that agency funds are distributed 
in a neutral manner, and damaged agency morale. 
Each of the four programs investigated by the Commission illustrates these 
weaknesses. While DSAS' flawed contracting process is not responsible for all of the problems 
afflicting these programs, it has allowed personal agendas, including the Director's, to interfere 
with and sometimes dominate the agency's funding decisions and oversight of the programs. In 
each case, the weaknesses contributed to the squandering of agency funds and, in some instances, 
helped to ensure the program's failure. 
The Commission's investigation does not establish the extent to which the four 
programs are typical of other DSAS-funded programs. However, the favoritism and waste of 
agency resources found in each program result from systemic weaknesses which can undermine 
the effectiveness of every DSAS-funded program. Nothing less than a substantial overhaul of the 




DSAS' efforts to expand drug-free treatment services in New York City have been 
plagued by weaknesses in procedures and practices that impair the morale and effectiveness of the 
agency's staff and cause the agency to spend its limited financial resources on costly or unproduc-
tive programs. At the root of these weaknesses is the agency's informal and unstructured 
contracting process, which is described in Part Two, Section I, of this report. Decisions are often 
made without benefit of established rules and procedures, thus permitting subjectivity and favorit-
ism while reducing accountability and precluding effective auditing. 
Where rules and procedures do exist, they are often vague or unwritten and thus 
easily ignored or manipulated. Even clearly written rules and procedures are sometimes 
disregarded when it is expedient. These problems are exacerbated by an agency management that 
tolerates and sometimes encourages ad hoc decision-making and discourages both adherence to 
rules and the imposition of sanctions for their violation. 
I. DSAS' CONTRACTING PROCESS LACKS 
NECESSARY RULES, PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS 
Various steps in the DSAS contracting process lack rules, procedures or standards 
for decision-making. For example, DSAS has only general criteria by which agency staff are to 
evaluate requests for renewed funding by existing service providers and no criteria for evaluating 
new program proposals. Nor is there any requirement that decisions to grant, continue or 
terminate funding, or to reverse decisions made by other staff members, be justified in writing. The 
absence of firm criteria and documentation makes objective and comparative evaluations of 
treatment programs and proposals difficult, while it facilitates 12Qfil-hoc rationalizations for 
whatever action is taken. 
The lack of procedures and standards is especially acute with respect to new 
programs. The agency eschews the use of a competitive process or even a uniform deadline for the 
receipt of applications, virtually ensuring that each proposal is considered in isolation. Further, 
once DSAS decides to fund a program, no firm criteria exist by which the agency may judge its 
development and progress. No target dates are imposed for such important steps as securing a site, 
achieving a full client census or attracting outside sources of revenue. In the absence of such 
7 
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·-guidelines, even an unsuccessful program enjoys a presumption of continued funding as DSAS 
"throws good money after bad" in the hope that the program will eventually improve. 
Those performance standards which do exist are sometimes so minimal as to be 
meaningless. For example, as the Commission's investigation into LNRI revealed (see Part Two, 
Section II (F)), effective treatment dictates that clients in an ambulatory program visit the program 
at least three or four times a week. Nonetheless, DSAS' standards permit such a program to 
include in its monthly census report any client who visited the program once in the previous 30 
days. 
IT. SUCH AGENCY RULES AND PROCEDURES AS EXIST ARE TOO VAGUE 
DSAS does have some rules and procedures which govern the contracting process. 
However, they are not always in writing and, even when they are, they are stated only in general 
terms. Thus, the rules are easily manipulated or disregarded. 
For example, regarding proposals from new providers seeking DSAS funding, the 
agency's Local Services Manual states that DSAS' Bureau of Contract Management and Fund 
Allocation ("Contract Management") is responsible for evaluating service provider funding 
applications and preparing recommendations concerning the "acceptability" of program proposals. 
However, nowhere is specified the factors which comprise an "acceptable" proposal or the 
Contract Management staff member responsible for making and justifying a decision to provide 
financial support for a new program. 
ID. CONTRACTING RULES AND PROCEDURES ARE DISREGARDED 
Even when clearly specified in writing, many DSAS rules and procedures are simply 
ignored. For example, as shown by the Commission's investigation into Prospect, Inc., and El 
Regreso (see Part Two, Sections III and V), even though the Local Services Manual specifies that 
funding applications are to be handled by Contract Management, other agency officials and 
employees handle or facilitate program proposals and make funding commitments for the agency 
when they choose to do so. 
Other examples abound: the Local Services Manual's requirement that troubled 
programs be discussed at meetings of the agency's Problem Program Committee is meaningless 
since the Committee was dissolved in 1985 (see Part Two, Section l(B) (3)). As both NECC and 
El Regreso illustrate (see Part Two, Sections IV(F) and V(D)), the requirements that subcontracts 
be competitively bid and that certain expenditures be pre-approved are ignored or waived 
retrospectively. Moreover, as detailed in the case ofNECC (see Part Two, Section IV(G)), DSAS 
8 
has permitted programs to form alter-ego corporations to buy treatment sites, then lease them back 
to the programs at a rent equal to or exceeding the mortgage payment, thereby circumventing the 
Mental Hygiene Law's prohibition on using state funds to pay more than 50% of a program's 
capital costs. 
Disregard for the rules is possible because agency decision-makers are not held 
accountable. There is no requirement that the steps in the decision-making process be docu-
mented. Without documentation, neither agency staff nor outside auditors can later determine 
who made the decisions or why they were made. 
IV. ADDITIONAL AGENCY CONTRACTING WEAKNESSES 
As discussed in the Commission's findings with respect to agency management, see 
Part Two, Section l(C), and as illustrated by all four programs investigated by the Commission, the 
above weaknesses are compounded by an environment fostered by DSAS' executive management, 
and Director Martinez in particular, that discourages staff adherence to procedures. Through his 
own actions, Director Martinez, however well-intentioned he may be, sends a message to his staff 
that the ends justify the means and the agency's rules and procedures are not important. He does 
so by intervening on behalf of certain programs, usurping the role of Contract Management, 
tolerating friends within the agency who do the same in his name, and expressing displeasure with 
those who adhere to the contracting rules. That message is also heard by officials of treatment 
programs who find it beneficial to circumvent the normal chain of command and ignore agency 
requirements. 
This environment is also fostered by the agency's reluctance to penalize problem 
programs. Because there are so few treatment providers, DSAS is reluctant to withhold funds or 
close programs. That reluctance, however, makes the agency hostage to the programs it is 
supposed to regulate.7 For example, the concern that no replacement could be found for LNRI's 
ambulatory program in Queens has for many years been used to justify continued DSAS funding of 
the program despite its inadequate performance and failure to comply with various DSAS require-
ments (see Part Two, Section II (F)). Similarly, because NECC met DSAS' need for increased 
treatment services, DSAS tolerated its nearly constant failure to comply with agency rules (see 
Part Two, Section IV 0) (3)). Only after scrutiny by the media and the State Comptroller's Office 
did DSAS terminate NECC's funding. 
7 DSAS attributes the scarcity of contractors to the many difficulties that confront potential treatment providers, such as 
low wages and community opposition. While these problems cannot be minimized, DSAS has not aggressively sought to increase 
the pool of service providers by widely advertising the availability of funds and soliciting competitive proposals. Instead, DSAS 
has relied largely on the existing community of service providers familiar to the agency to expand treatment capacity, thereby 
preserving the insular nature of che treatment community. 
9 
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Directors of treatment programs have little incentive to comply with agency rules 
and procedures because they know that DSAS' overworked staff is unlikely to uncover violations 
and may be persuaded to ignore them if they do. Moreover, since, as a practical matter, the most 
severe penalty imposed is recoupment of unauthorized expenditures from succeeding years' 
budgets, DSAS' auditing program has little deterrent effect. 
The agency's reluctance to close or penalize programs that fail to perform reflects 
the conflict between DSAS' dual functions in New York City as regulator of treatment programs 
and advocate for increased services: the enormous pressure to meet an overwhelming demand for 
treatment is simply inconsistent with the oversight function. DSAS is compelled to assume both 
roles in New York City because there, unlike other localities, no local government agency 
identifies community treatment needs and selects service providers. Requiring DSAS to substitute 
for a local government agency and oversee compliance requires the agency to pursue contradictory 
objectives, increases the agency workload, and makes more difficult the successful performance of 
either function. 
V. TifE EFFECTS OF DSAS' WEAK RULES AND PROCEDURES 
DSAS' ad hoc contracting practices make responsibility diffuse or impossible and 
expedience the guiding principle. In these circumstances it should not be surprising and may be 
inevitable that personal relationships and private agendas dominate some of the agency's 
contractual relationships with service providers. 
The evidence concerning all four programs under investigation indicates that a 
personal connection to Director Martinez or other executive staff members smoothed the way for 
DSAS funding. As described in more detail in the Commission's factual findings in Part Two 
below: 
1) La N ueva Raza Institute, Executive Director 
Rafael Cantelloos (Part Two, Section II) 
Cantellops had direct access to Martinez, which not only helped him secure initial 
funding for LNRI in 1981, but also was instrumental in avoiding de,funding in 1982 
and in obtaining additional funds for his residential program in 1986 and 
subsequent years. 
10 
2) Prospect, Inc., Executive Director 
Arnold Freeman (Part Two, Section Ill) 
The usual proces.s for evaluating and approving proposals was circumvented by 
Martinez and Charles LaPorte (DSAS Deputy Director for Chemotherapy 
Services), who created the impression that the project was a priority initiative of the 
Governor's office and instructed Contract Management to provide funding. In 
fact, the project was the private initiative of Ben Fernandez, a friend of Martinez 
and LaPorte, and the Governor's office was disinterested. Once under contract, 
Prospect enjoyed special attention and protection from LaPorte because of 
LaPorte's friendship with and desire to please Fernandez. 
3) National Expert Care Consultants, Inc., 
President Don Rus.sakoff (Part Two, Section IV) 
By virtue of his direct acces.s to Martinez, Rus.sakoff was able to secure a $4.2 
million funding commitment for NECC without any competition,8 even though a 
competitive proces.s probably would have yielded the most efficient allocation of 
those funds. This is particularly true since DSAS was prepared to provide the 
money to a profit~making busines.s; an RFP proces.s would have yielded guidelines 
for appropriate profit margins and the contractor willing to provide services for the 
least profit. 
4) El Regreso, Executive Director 
Carlos Pagan (Part Two, Section V) 
Pagan's funding proposal was handled outside of Contract Management by his 
friend and Director Martinez's as.sistant, Franklin Soto, who effectively committed 
DSAS to funding El Regreso. 
Where DSAS officials have a personal interest in a program, objective evaluation is 
impaired. For example, in deciding to fund NECC (see Part Two, Section IV(C)), Director 
Martinez dismissed or ignored his staff's and another agency's concerns about the program, thus 
evincing a vested interest incompatible with objective decision~making. Similarly, Deputy Director 
8 Wimesses contend that Russakoff's advantage was his possession of a site for his program. However, an organized bid 
solicitation process that publicized the contract terms that were provided NECC, such as a grant for the purchase of midtown 





LaPorte's persistent sup{X)rt of Prospect impeded Contract Management's assessment of the 
program and caused Gerard Armstrong (Deputy Director of Contract Management) to hesitate 
urging its closure (see Part Two, Section III). Contract Management's unsuccessful attempt to 
close LNRI in 1982 and Martinez's continuing sup{X)rt for the program (see Part Two, Section 
II (E) and (F)) is perhaps the best illustration of Armstrong's observation that "it is a lot more 
difficult for Contract Management to act objectively" when there is a personal connection between 
a program and DSAS executive management. 9 
Finally, DSAS' ad hoc contracting process also results in dangerously low staff 
morale. Contract Management staff see rules bent or ignored and their authority usurped by 
others. In such an atmosphere, they believe that their work is irrelevant; their initiative and sense 
of professionalism and common pur{X)se is undermined. Feeling helpless to alter the course of 
events, Contract Management staff come to believe that their role is simply to "process paper." 
The fear of reprisal for following rules render staff members unwilling to make difficult decisions 
and thus encourages inertia. Ultimately, the staffs sense of futility erodes vigorous enforcement of 
the agency's already deficient rules and procedures. 
9 Armstrong Tr. at 352. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
As long as DSAS continues to contract out for the provision of treatment services, 
greater objectivity and accountability in its decision-making process is imperative. Toward that 
end, the agency should adopt more specific and stringent procedures governing all aspects of the 
contracting process. Section I below sets forth recommended changes in DSAS' contracting 
process. 
Some of the agency's weaknesses could be ameliorated by government action that 
goes beyond changing DSAS' contracting practices. For example, the creation of a local 
government substance abuse agency in New York City would help reduce the heavy burden that 
DSAS currently shoulders and ease the conflict between the agency's several missions. This and 
other recommendations that require action by other agencies or levels of government are discussed 
in Sections II, III and IV below. 
I. DSAS MUST ADOPT MORE SPECIFIC AND STRINGENT 
CONTRACTING PROCEDURES TO BRING MORE OBJECTIVITY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY TO ITS DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
Although some discretion is both inevitable and desirable in the contracting 
process, the efficient management of limited resources and public confidence in government 
require that agency decision-making be channeled through well-defined procedures, guided by 
standardized criteria, and thoroughly documented. 
A. A Written, Competitive Funding Process 
Each year, DSAS should identify funds available for new and expanded treatment 
services and award them by a competitive process. The availability of funds should be widely 
advertised, uniform deadlines should be set for submission of funding applications, and the receipt 
and evaluation of proposals should be routinized. Existing programs should be required to 
compete in this process for any funding increase over the previous year's level, other than 
increases necessary to maintain existing service levels. 
To ensure that all funding proposals are handled identically by the agency, the 
competitive process should be set forth in clearly written regulations or procedures. Such regula-
.. 13 
·-tions should specify that all funding applications must be sent to the Deputy Director for Contract 
Management. 10 
The regulations or procedures should also specify, by job title, the individual(s) to 
whom the Deputy Director is to refer proposals and establish each individual's responsibility ~' 
evaluation and recommendation) with respect to the proposal. 11 
B. An Evaluation Form For Identifying 
Appropriate Criteria And Their Respective Weight 
An evaluation form should be developed for rating fuhding applications, and the 
written guidelines or procedures must require completion of the form by a specified DSAS staff 
member. The form should identify all criteria appropriate for consideration in determining 
whether a program is to receive DSAS funding, such as whether the contractor is experienced or 
otherwise qualified; will serve a geographic area or population that has insufficient treatment 
services; and meets predetermined guidelines for treatment cost per client. 12 
The evaluation form should assign a value or "points" to each criterion so that the 
application can be graded. This grading system will ensure that each criterion has a predetermined 
weight and is given appropriate consideration. It will also facilitate objective comparison of the 
merits of competing funding applications. No application should be funded unless it meets a 
predetermined minimum score, and no application should be funded before another receiving a 
higher score. 
The regulations or guidelines should require the individual responsible for 
completing the evaluation form to prepare and sign a written recommendation indicating whether 
funding should be approved or denied. This recommendation should contain an explanation of 
how each criterion was scored and identify anyone who contributed information or advice used in 
scoring and making the recommendation. 
IO The regulations also should require that all officials and employees of the agency so instruct any prospective contrac-
tor, and that an application received by anyone else in the agency should be forwarded immediately to the Deputy Director with 
a cover memo indicating when and how it was received. The cover memo should be preserved in the Deputy Director's files. 
11 A routing slip should be used by the Deputy Director to show when he received the proposal, the individual(s) to whom 
it was then forwarded, and receipt by the individual(s). If anyone other than the individual(s) specified in the guidelines is 
involved at this preliminary stage of the process, that person's name and the nature of the involvement should be noted on the 
routing slip. 
12 The State Department of Social Services has successfully used an evaluation form, similar to the one recommended 
herein, for awarding Homeless Housing and Assistance Program grants. 
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At each successive level of the decision-making process a similar document should 
be prepared and signed, specifying any additional or different considerations taken into account. A 
decision to reverse a recommendation made at a previous level in the process should be explained 
with particularity. 
C. Standards And Timetables For Program Development Grants 
Pre-established standards and timetables should govern program development 
grants which cover the pre-operational phase of a program. During this phase, salaries and staffing 
levels should be standardized, and target dates should be imposed for securing title or a lease, 
beginning operations and achieving minimum client census. 
A program that fails to meet a target should be ineligible for further DSAS funding 
without written justification demonstrating that the failure will be corrected by a date certain. 
DSAS should develop criteria governing the suspension or reduction of funding for programs that 
fail to meet a required target. These targets and sanctions, if enforced, will provide incentive for 
new programs to act expeditiously and achieve objective standards, and at the same time help 
DSAS to avoid committing more and more money to projects that cannot get off the ground. 
Further, DSAS should adopt a policy similar to that of the State Department of 
Social Services, under which funding is not released to a service provider until anticipated funding 
commitments from outside sources have been obtained (see Part Two, Section II (H)). Where 
DSAS expects other agencies to contribute to a program's budget, as with LNRI's residential 
program and Prospect's initial proposal to acquire Prospect Hospital (see Part Two, Sections 
Il(H) (1) and IIl(C)), the service provider should prove its ability to tap the other sources before 
DSAS begins spending its own limited funds. 
If a treatment provider is expected to decrease its dependence on DSAS funds by 
securing funding from other sources, the amount of that funding and a predetermined schedule for 
its receipt also should be identified at the outset. Programs that fail to keep to the schedule should 
be ineligible for further DSAS funding unless the service provider documents to DSAS' 
satisfaction that the requfred level of outside funding will be achieved by a date certain. 
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D. Meaningful Performance Standards And Penalti~-For Non-Compliance 
DSAS should establish its own written performance standards governing such 
matters as client census; frequency of client visits; client turnover; and group, individual and family 
counseling. These standards should require a level of performance deemed necessary by DSAS to 
provide effective treatment, and failure to meet the standards should trigger a target date by when 
performance must be improved or funding reduced or terminated. 
Also essential are stringent reporting and disclosure requirements and penalties for 
failure to meet performance standards or to submit accurate reports. Programs that persistently fail 
to submit required and accurate documentation must be subject to penalties. 
Similarly, DSAS must develop and impose penalties for failure to comply with 
existing rules such as those requiring competitive bidding of subcontracts and advance written 
approval of certain expenditures. DSAS must establish by regulation that under no circumstance 
will any rule be waived retrospectively, and that no reimbursement can be made for an expenditure 
incurred in violation of such a rule. 
Exemption from any rule should be possible only with prior written approval of the 
program's contract manager and the Deputy Director for Contract Management, with an 
explanation of the compelling circumstances justifying the exemption. DSAS should identify in its 
regulations or guidelines those factors justifying exemption; expedience should not be one of them. 
E. Objective Procedures For Evaluating Problem Programs 
The regulations or guidelines should include criteria for determining whether a 
"problem program" should be de-funded and to establish staff responsibility for that determination. 
The regulations or guidelines should define "problem programs" and require a 
written statement of the reasons for the program's failure to satisfy DSAS performance standards 
and whether the problems are amenable to improvement with a reasonable level of assistance from 
the agency. Termination of funding should be required unless the contract manager can articulate 
in writing a reasonable basis to conclude that the problem is temporary and can be remedied with 
agency assistance. 
The regulations or guidelines also should specify all appropriate steps that Contract 
Management may take to assist a program. DSAS should encourage "problem programs" to accept 
DSAS guidance by routinely imposing a probationary period by the end of which the program must 
demonstrate improvement. A second evaluation at the end of the probationary period should 
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describe in detail the problems prompting the probationary period, Contract Management's efforts 
to remedy the problems, and the extent to which those efforts have been successful. 
If the program has not sufficiently remedied its performance problems to be 
removed from "problem program" status, funding should be terminated unless Contract Manage-
ment can demonstrate that a brief extension of the probationary period will be sufficient to remedy 
the problems. 13 
DSAS also should develop criteria governing continued funding for programs that 
cannot sustain their performance after having been removed from "problem program" status. 
Recidivist programs such as LNRI (see Part Two, Section II (F) and (H)) should not be treated the 
same as new "problem programs": they should not be granted the same probationary periods nor 
command the same amount of DSAS' assistance, unless DSAS documents that the newest 
problems are unrelated to the earlier ones and, if remedied, are not likely to be succeeded by still 
more substandard performance. 
F. Greater DSAS Authority Over The Management Of Treatment Programs 
Where failure to achieve performance standards is attributable to poor program 
management, DSAS should have as an option the power to insist that a program's management be 
replaced. That power is inherent in the agency's authority to terminate funding, and DSAS 
should establish it and procedures for doing so in the agency's regulations and service provider 
contracts. 14 
Since finding and obtaining sites for the operation of treatment programs is difficult, 
consideration should be given to allowing DSAS to retain the right to take control of property 
purchased or leased with DSAS funds in the event that the funded service provider fails to 
perform adequately or to follow DSAS requirements. 15 For example, if program problems are the 
result of poor administration and program executive management or the board of directors is 
unresponsive to DSAS' demands for reforms, DSAS could be authorized to assert control over the 
property and s~bstitute a different service provider. 
13 In some circumstances, a reduction in DSAS funding may be more appropriate than termination. DSAS should specify 
such circumstances in its regulations or guidelines. 
l4 To the extent that a program receives substantial funding from other sources, it will be less easily influenced by DSAS' 
funding decisions. However, the poorly managed programs appear to be the ones most dependent on DSAS funds. 
15 Such a right could be established either by securing an interest in the title or lease, or by contract with the service 
provider. 
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·-The power to assume the lease or title to program sites also would be useful when 
service providers change location or go out of business for reasons unrelated to poor performance. 
For example, when the Veritas program moved from the site that NECC later rented (see Part 
Two, Section IV(C) (1)), if DSAS could have acquired the building instead ofNECC then DSAS 
could have sought competitive proposals to run a treatment program there. 
G. Better Record-Keeping Practices 
DSAS should establish rules requiring that all contracting decisions and their 
explanations be reduced to writing. All documents ·relating to each program should be maintained 
in a central file system. These requirements will ensure that the contracting process can be 
audited and the reasons for decisions and the identity of the individuals responsible for them 
discovered. 16 
H. Disclosure And Certification Requirements 
All applicants for DSAS funding should be under a continuing duty to disclose the 
identity of all shareholders, directors, officers and employees of the corporation; any personal or 
professional relationships each may have with DSAS officials and employees; and any outside 
employment that would interfere or conflict with the performance of any full-time duties. Any 
other actual or potential conflicts of interest, such as a financial interest in property to be acquired 
with DSAS funds, also must be disclosed. 
Similarly, when a treatment provider seeks DSAS approval of a subcontract, the 
request for approval should include disclosure of the subcontractor's principals and employees and 
the existence of any personal or professional relationships they may have with DSAS employees 
and program officials and employees. The service provider should be required to certify that 
DSAS procedures, such as competitive bidding requirements, were followed and that the proposed 
subcontract is the product of arm's length negotiations. Failure to make required disclosures and 
the provision of inaccurate information must be subject to specified penalties. 
I. Leadership That Encourages Adherence To Rules 
No enhanced rules, procedures and sanctions will be effective without leadership 
that supports their enforcement. Agency management must demonstrate commitment to the 
contracting process through words and actions. Respect for procedural regularity can also be 
16 Contract managers should also maintain a daily log of their activities with respect to each program under their juris-
diction. Such a record should include a brief description of any conversations they have with program personnel and other 
DSAS staff. 
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fostered by agency seminars and workshops aimed at educating staff about the workings and 
importance of contracting procedures. 
II. A NEW YORK CI1Y SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE AGENCY SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED 
The creation of a New York City agency to identify treatment needs and service 
providers, such as exists nearly everywhere else in the State, would be of substantial benefit in 
eliminating the problems encountered by DSAS in its efforts to administer and expand treatment 
services in New York City. A local government agency would reduce the burden on Contract 
Management staff and permit DSAS to exercise a larger and more effective oversight role. 
Moreover, the involvement of two independent levels of government, accountable to separate 
constituencies, would provide the necessary checks and balances to ensure that each acts with 
objectivity. 
ID. THE STATE OR NEW YORK CI1Y SHOULD LOCATE 
AND ESTABLISH ITS OWN TREATMENT FACILITIES 
Since one source of DSAS' difficulty in expanding treatment services is the dearth 
of organizations and individuals willing to provide such services, DSAS should consider a limited 
return to the direct provision of treatment either by itself or by a New York City agency. 
With the substance abuse problem at crisis levels, particularly in New York City, 
the provision of necessary services should not be left exclusively to a private sector that is 
unwilling or unable to meet the need. Providing treatment for substance abusers cannot be 
handled in the same manner as building highways or even caring for the elderly, where private 
contractors are more plentiful. The client population simply does not attract sufficient private 
sector providers. 
Government operated treatment services would ensure that treatment is provided 
in neighborhoods where existing programs and potential contractors are reluctant to do business. 
Moreover, such programs would generally enhance DSAS' resources and flexibility in fighting drug 
addiction. These additional resources would create competition with existing programs so that 
DSAS is not completely dependent upon them. 
Similarly, since finding and obtaining sites for the provision of services is particularly 
difficult, the State or the City should directly purchase and renovate treatment sites even for 
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programs that will be privately operated. While problems such as ~ommunity opposition will not 
be eliminated, the government can exercise eminent domain to acquire property and tap the 
resources of such agencies as the New York State Facilities Development Corporation. Perhaps 
more important, DSAS would avoid expending its own limited financial resources on drawn-0ut 
and often unsuccessful efforts to acquire treatment sites by individuals and organizations who lack 
the skills and knowledge necessary for such an endeavor. 
IV. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES SHOULD 
POOL INFORMATION ABOUT SOCIAL SERVICE CONTRACTORS 
Because some social service providers contract with and receive funds from more 
than one government agency, more formal inter~agency coordination would enable each agency to 
draw upon the experience of others. A computerized central registry of contractors should be 
created and each agency should be required to file an annual standardized report on each service 
provider with which it has contracted. The report should contain information regarding the type 
of service provided, the contract period and budget categories ~. rent, capital improvements, 
equipment) for which funding is received, any problems that the agency encountered in its 
dealings with the contractor, and whether the contract was terminated for any reason. 
All agencies should be required to check the central registry before contracting 
with a service provider in order to make sure that the contractor is reliable and is not paid twice for 
the same materials, services or space. Such a requirement would help avoid situations like those 
encountered by DSAS when it decided to fund NECC (see Part Two, Section IV(C) (3)). IfDSAS 
Contract Management had checked with a central registry and learned the details surrounding 
NECC's prior contract with the State Division of Parole; had evaluated the Division of Parole's 
problems with NECC and the advisability of contracting with NECC in light of them; and 
developed a plan for avoiding similar problems in its contract with NECC, then the history of 
DSAS' relationship with NECC might have been much different. 
Likewise, if DSAS had filed yearly reports on its problems with LNRI, and if the 
Department of Social Services had reviewed those reports before deciding to award its funds to 
LNRI's residential program, then substantial state funds might not have been wasted on that 
project (see Part Two, Section 11(0)). 
* * * 
Adoption of the procedural recommendations outlined above in Section I will 
impose some additional requirements on DSAS staff. However, many of the problems in DSAS' 
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contracting process stem in part from the agency's focus on immediate expansion of treatment 
capacity without concern for the long-term consequences of its lax contracting process. Faithful 
adherence to more rigorous procedures will improve the integrity of the process, yield more 
effective and productive treatment programs, and attract more treatment providers. Adoption of 
the other Commission recommendations will reduce some of the agency's burdens and permit it to 




I. AGENCY STRUCTURE AND CONTRACTING PROCESS 
A. Agency Organizational Structure 
DSAS is comprised of twelve bureaus, each of which is headed by a Deputy 
Director who reports to the First Deputy Director and the Director. 17 A principal focus of this 
investigation is the agency's Bureau of Contract Management and Fund Allocation ("Contract 
Management"), which has primary responsibility for funding and monitoring local service providers 
through a staff of contract managers in eight regional offices. 18 This investigation focuses on 
Region 7, comprised only of New York City. 19 
Julio A. Martinez has been the Director of the agency since 1979. Norwig Debye-
Saxinger has been the First Deputy Director since 1984, when he was promoted from his position 
as Deputy Director of Contract Management. Gerard Armstrong has been Deputy Director of 
Contract Management since Debye-Saxinger's promotion, and previously was the Downstate 
Chief of Contract Management. The current Downstate Chief of Contract Management is 
Carleton Deming. 
B. Agency Contracting Procedures And Practices 
DSAS' contracting process in New Yark City is unique because of the absence 
since the mid- l 970's of any local government agency with responsibility for substance abuse 
services. Outside New York City, DSAS generally contracts with county social service agencies, 
l 7 The twelve bureaus are: Administration and Fiscal Management; Counsel; Communications; Prevention and Educational 
Services; Chemotherapy Services; Government and Community Relations; Program Development; Field Audit and Program 
Review; Evaluation and Research; Contract Management and Fund Allocation; Program Services; and Laboratories and Testing. 
l8 DSAS Local Services Manual, Items 1501 and 1503. See also Armstrong Tr. at 152. 
19 Regions 1-6 include all counties north of New York City and are supervised by the Upstate Chief of Contract 
Management in Albany. Region 8 covers Nas.sau and Suffolk Counties; Regions 7 and 8 are supervised by the Downstate Chief 
of Contract Management at the agency's regional office at 55 West 125th Street, New York City. The Upstate and Downstate 
Chiefs report to the Deputy Director for Contract Management who is located at the agency's executive offices at 250 Broadway, 
New York City. 
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which are responsible for identifying service needs and providers.2'0 New York City's Addiction 
Services Agency used to perform that role, but was dissolved during the City's fiscal crisis; since 
then, DSAS has assumed direct responsibility for managing all service provider contracts in the five 
boroughs and finding and contracting for new and expanded services. 21 
Contract Management's responsibility to evaluate pro{X)Sals and negotiate 
contracts is described briefly in DSAS' Policy and Procedure Manual for Local Service Providers 
and Local Services Manual.22 These guidelines are general and provide little detail concerning 
how the agency's funding decisions are made. 
1. Existing Treatment Providers 
Existing treatment programs annually submit applications for renewed funding and, 
as long as a program seems "cost effective" and has gcxxi client utilization, it is virtually assured of 
receiving funding at least at the same level as the previous year.23 Each year, after DSAS evaluates 
the new state budget, it usually informs existing programs whether and to what extent they can 
increase their funding pro{X)Sals over the previous year's contract.24 
DSAS does not require existing programs to compete for funding.25 When a 
program applies for renewed funding, its contract manager is sup[X)Sed to complete a ''W orkscope 
and Budget Pro{X)Sal Review" form which contains a small space for "Summary/ Recommenda-
tions. "26 However, because of understaffing and heavy workloads in the New York City office, the 
form is not completed for as many as half the programs handled by that office.27 In any event, the 
ZO Armstrong Tr. at 75; Deming Tr. at 46. DSAS has occasionally entered into direct contracts with service providers out· 
side of New York City. See, ~ Armstrong Tr. at 406-07. 
2! Armstrong Tr. at 75-76, 89; Deming Tr. at 46; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 18. 
22 DSAS Policy and Procedure Manual for Service Providers, Items 2100.1 and 2100.2; DSAS Local Services Manual, Items 
1501, 1503 and 3100. 
23 Armstrong Tr. at 76; Deming Tr. at 32-35, 43; Memorandum of Interview with Gerard Armstrong, dated June 22, 1989. 
DSAS' Policy and Procedure Manual for Local Service Providers, Item 2100.2, contains a list of "factors• to be considered in 
reviewing an application for renewed funding. These include such matters as •a continuing, demonstrated need for services," 
"prior and current year utilization," and "service cost.• The manual does not indicate how DSAS staff should determine the 
extent to which a program satisfies these factors, or each factor's relative weight. 
24 Deming Tr. at 34-39, 56. 
25 Armstrong Tr. at 89. 
26 Memorandum of Interview with Gerard Armstrong, dated June 22, 1989. 
27 !Q. 
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form does not call for any comparison of the applicant's costs or programmatic effectiveness with 
other existing treatment providers. 
2. New Treatment Providers 
DSAS' contracting process for new or expanded programs in New York City is 
informal, varying from program to program.28 With only one exception,29 DSAS has not issued a 
request for proposals ("RFP") for new or expanded programs unless a competitive process is 
specifically required by the legislative appropriation,30 and legislatively required RFPs in this field 
have been scarce.31 
Although DSAS management has expressed interest in increasing the number of 
service providers, and Armstrong believes that an RFP process is a useful means of doing so, 32 
agency officials have been reluctant to use RFPs because of the time and staff necessary to 
complete the paperwork.33 They consider a competitive process not worth the effort required to 
overcome the difficulty in attracting new treatment providers.34 
When DSAS determines that it has sufficient funds to finance new or expanded 
programs, it advises providers of the availability of the funds by word of mouth or by circulating an 
administrative bulletin.35 However, unsolicited funding proposals for new or expanded services are 
28 Deming Tr. at 179-81, 185-87, 190-91; Ringer Tr. at 114-15. 
29 The one exception occurred in 1986 and involved an effort to increase vocational services for drug programs and their 
clients. Armstrong Tr. at 81-83, 90. Although others in the agency opposed the idea, Armstrong made the decision to use an 
RFP because "[i]t had never been done before" and he liked the objective, competitive process. !Q.. at 82, 88. The response 
was "overwhelming." !Q.. at 82. 
30 Armstrong Tr. at 76, 78; Deming Tr. at 182-84. The DSAS Local Services Manual, Item 3110, contains a detailed RFP 
procedure that the agency "may" use, when it deems "appropriate," for funds that are "allocated or appropriated ... for specific 
local program purposes." 
31 In 1985, funds for homeless substaRce abusers were required to be distributed through an RFP process, as are certain 
federal funds and funds distribute<! through a State task force for projects sponsored by more than one agency. Deming Tr. at 
183-84; Armstrong Tr. at 83, 90-91. Starting this year, State funds for capital projects (!&, facility acquisition and renova-
tion) must be expended through an RFP process. Armstrong Tr. at 83. 
32 Armstrong Tr. at 85, 89. 
33 !Q.. at 91. See also Deming Tr. at 191-93; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 292. 
34 Armstrong Tr. at 87. A computer print-out provided by DSAS to the Commission indicates that, since 1979, DSAS 
has increased the number of all drug-free treatment providers in New York City from 34 to 51, and the number of residential 
treatment providers from 19 to 26. 
35 Armstrong Tr. at 91-93; Deming Tr. at 179-82. 
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received by DSAS throughout the year.36 Although proposal~-may arrive at any level of the 
agency, they are supposed to be forwarded to the Deputy Director for Contract Management 
(Armstrong) for an initial review to determine if they have merit and can be accommodated within 
DSAS' budget.37 
If Armstrong concludes that a proposal warrants further consideration, he forwards 
it to the appropriate regional office for evaluation by a contract manager.38 There are no written 
criteria by which a proposal may be evaluated, except that funding priority is given to proposals to 
serve "high need areas" and which have a local govemment funding commitment. 39 
The contract manager is supposed to make a recommendation which is communi, 
cated to his or her regional office supervisor, to the Downstate or Upstate Chief, and finally to 
Deputy Director Armstrong.40 Armstrong then decides whether to fund a program, but might 
consult with Director Martinez and/or First Deputy Director Debye,Saxinger before doing so.41 
Sometimes the contract manager's recommendation will be made in writing, but 
often an informal discussion is all that takes place.42 Since 1986, new funding proposals are 
supposed to be evaluated using the "Workscope and Budget Proposal Review" form,43 but, as with 
applications for renewed funding, the form is used as little as 50% of the time in the New York City 
office .44 
36 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 113. 
37 Armstrong Tr. at 77-79; Deming Tr. at 200. 
38 Armstrong Tr. at 93-94, 97; DSAS Local Services Manual, Item 1501. If DSAS has insufficient funds for a proposal, 
or if the proposal is "outlandish" in cost or purpose, the Depury Director does not send it on for further review and so informs 
the applicant either by letter or by telephone. Armstrong Tr. at 78-80. A reasonable proposal that cannot be accepted due 
to lack of funds will be saved for no more than a year. !Q. at 125. 
39 DSAS' Policy and Procedure Manual for Service Providers, Item 2100.l, p.l ("Criteria"). 
40 Armstrong Tr. at 94, 100-01 . 
41 !Q. at 101-02. 
42 !Q. at 101. If the staff disagrees, "then it's carefully written up." !Q. However, Armstrong could not recall a situation 
where Contract Management staff was unable to reach a consensus on a funding decision. See Memorandum of Interview with 
Gerard Armstrong, dated June 22, 1989. 
43 See above, p. 24-25. 
44 Memorandum of Interview with Gerard Armstrong, dated June 22, 1989. 
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3. Recoupment And Termination Of Funding 
DSAS does not require service providers to routinely document that their 
expenditures were consistent with budgetary restrictions or regulatory requirements, such as 
competitive bidding.45 When DSAS discovers that a program has spent money improperly or 
without required authorization, the funds are normally recouped by withholding payments under 
contracts in later years. 46 
Programs with serious problems and the possible termination of funding must be 
discussed at a meeting of the "Problem Program Review Committee."47 However, that committee 
was disbanded in 1985 because it was considered ineffective.48 Programs that violate any statute, 
rule or regulation relating to the operation of a substance abuse program may be fined up to one 
thousand dollars,49 but the Commission's investigation disclosed no case in which such a penalty 
was imposed. 
Indeed, because of the scarcity of treatment providers, DSAS is reluctant to de-
fund or penalize problem programs and ''bends over backwards" to help them. 50 The most 
problematic programs tend to be the smaller ones which have the fewest resources and are most 
dependent on DSAS funding, and for those programs DSAS is reluctant even to disallow 
unauthorized expenditures. 51 
A recommendation to terminate funding usually originat.es with the contract 
manager responsible for the program, although on at least one occasion Armstrong decided to cut 
off funding without the contract manager's input.52 Armstrong will not de-fund a program 
45 Deming Tr. at 78-80, 85-86. 
46 !Q. at 72-75. 
47 DSAS Local Services Manual, Item 4302. The Problem Program Committee is composed of the First Deputy Director, 
Counsel, Deputy Director for Contract Management, Deputy Director for Field Audit and PrograJD Review, Deputy Director 
for Government and Community Relations (community problems), Deputy Director for Prevention and Education Services 
(school programs), Deputy Director for Methadone Services· (methadone services), and "other Unit Heads as appropriate." !Q. 
48 Armstrong Tr. at 25. 
49 Mental Hygiene Law§ 23.03(a) . 
50 Armstrong Tr. at 86-87, 149. 
51 !Q. at 159; Deming Tr. at 73-74, 150-5 l. 
52 Armstrong Tr. at 160. 
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without first writing a justification for the action and discussing it.~th Director Martinez and First 
Deputy Director Debye,Saxinger.53 
C. Agency Management 
Contract Management's ability to carry out its responsibilities objectively and 
effectively is impaired by the personal involvement in the contracting process of Director Martinez 
and, to a lesser extent, First Deputy Director Debye,Saxinger, and by the relationship between the 
two men. 
1. Executive Management's Personal 
Involvement In The Contracting Process 
Director Martinez views the agency's contracting procedures as an obstacle to the 
quick expansion and delivery of treatment services.54 In order to cut through "red tape," he 
sometimes takes a personal role in the contracting process. 55 In doing so, he disregards Contract 
Management staff and agency procedures, relying instead on certain trusted advisers who have no 
official roles in the contracting process.56 
For example, Charles LaPorte, DSAS Deputy Director for Chemotherapy Services, 
is a close friend of Martinez and is seen by agency staff as influential with the Director and as exer, 
cising the Director's authority.57 LaPorte pressures Contract Management staff to give certain 
programs special treatment by going to staff directly when Armstrong isnot there.58 Invoking 
Martinez's name, LaPorte urges the staff to accommodate a program financially, to give it more 
assistance or higher priority, or to approve the hiring of a particular individual; in short, "to move 
whatever he wants moved."59 
53 IQ. at 57, 161. 
54 Damm Tr. at 15; Armstrong Tr. at 1327. See also Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 100-01. 
55 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 15-16, 100. 
56 IQ. at 62 (Martinez "clearly has gone outside of the normal expected channels to either help generate programs or he 
has countenanced providers that somehow came to him to go outside of the normal channels") . See also !!!· at 36-40, 72-73, 
146, 153, 161 , 221, 254, 259-60; Damm Tr. at 11-12. 
57 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 62, 70, 105; Armstrong Tr. at 1176-77. 
58 Armstrong Tr. at 1177, 1438-39. 
59 IQ. at 1176-79. See also Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 38-39, 105, 404-05. Martinez once distributed a memorandum entitled 
"Julio Says," warning staff not to use his name in their effort to advance pet projects within the agency. Armstrong Tr. at 1436. 
However, the memo did not change either LaPorte's behavior or the staffs reaction to it. Id. at 1437. 
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Franklin Soto, who has held a variety of positions within the agency, also is a close 
friend of Martinez and acts as the Director's agent to advance certain projects.60 Soto reports to 
Martinez in detail about the staffs activities and therefore is widely seen as the Director's "eyes and 
ears."61 Because Soto takes direction only from Martinez, others in the agency find him disruptive 
and difficult to work with.62 
Because Director Martinez prefers informality and believes that he should be 
accessible to people in the treatment field, he tolerates and even encourages program directors 
who go around Contract Management to contact him directly, whether in regard to an established 
or a proposed program. 63 Program directors who are personally or professionally close to Martinez 
have more access to him than others.64 According to Debye,Saxinger, in seeking to expand 
services Martinez seems to rely on people he already knows or who approach him directly, rather 
than on an established, systematic process. 65 
First Deputy Director Debye,Saxinger also sometimes takes a personal role in the 
contracting process and bypasses the usual Contract Management procedures.66 Although 
Debye,Saxinger did not come to DSAS from the treatment field, he developed ties to certain 
programs that he worked with when he was head of Contract Management, and these programs 
tend to deal directly with him. 67 
60 Armstrong Tr. at 1188-90, 1211-12, 1220-23; Soto Tr. at 3-7. See also Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 36. Soto considers 
Martinez to be one of his "best friends" and they socialize together when Martinez is in New York or Soto is in Albany. Soto 
Tr. at 16. 
61 Armstrong Tr. at 1190, 1220-21. 
62 
.IQ.. at 1189-90, 1220-21. Armstrong has told Martinez about Soto's disruptive effect, but the Director's response was 
that he found Soto useful. .IQ.. at 1221. 
63 
.IQ.. at 42, 44-45, 357, 819-29; D~mm Tr. at 29; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 62, 84-85, 118-19, 151, 261. 
64 Armstrong Tr. at 46. Before becoming Director of DSAS, Martinez developed close relationships in the New York City 
drug-free treatment community, first as a client in a treatment program, then the founder and director of Project Return, a 
residential program, and then as the head of the New York City chapter of Therapeutic Communities of America. .IQ.. at 35 7. 
See also Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 156-57. 
65 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 84-85. See also .!Q. at 161-62, 221, 265, 267, 280. Debye-Saxinger described Martinez's efforts 
at expanding services in these terms: "a kind of daily ... 'I know you, you look good, do it, here's some money.'" !Q. at 77. 
66 Armstrong Tr. at 220, 230, 399-401, 410-11. 
67 .IQ.. at 42, 49-50, 353, 361, 362, 399-401 , 408-09. See also Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 576-78. 
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·-2. The Relationship Between Director 
Martinez And First Deputy Director Debye-Saxinger 
Armstrong testified that Director Martinez and First Deputy Director Debye-
Saxinger have a difficult relationship which stems from the l 970's, when Martinez ran Project 
Return and Debye-Saxinger was head of Contract Management.68 During that time, they had 
differences of opinion on DSAS funding for Project Return and how its contract was handled.69 
Martinez views Debye-Saxinger as too bureaucratic and overly concerned with 
procedures.70 If Debye-Saxinger expresses concerns about a particular course of action, suggests a 
different way to handle the matter, or does not seem fully supportive of one of Martinez's projects, 
Martinez feels challenged and may eliminate him from discussions and decision-making and handle 
the matter himself. 71 The two co-exist by allowing each other to handle autonomously the _ 
programs with which each has close relationships; they "have a sense of resignation, or helplessness 
about the other's territory."72 
3. The Consequences For Contract Management 
Of Executive Management's Personal Involvement 
When a program director has a personal connection to BSAS executive 
management, staff believe that they must accord the program every possible accommodation and 
give it priority over all others. 73 For example, Contract Management has been able to "terminate 
funding of programs more expeditiously" when there is no personal link to Martinez or Debye-
Saxinger. 74 
68 Armstrong Tr. at 48. 
69 !Q. at 48, 1328. 
70 Damm Tr. at 13-14. For his part, Debye-Saxinger sees Martinez as a poor manager and believes that he could administer 
the agency better than Martinez. Armstrong Tr. at 232. 
71 Damm Tr. at 7-8. Indeed, Martinez views Debye-Saxinger with great -suspicion: he believes that the First Deputy 
Director is the person responsible for complaints to this Commission, the Inspector General, and to the newspapers about the 
programs under investigation. Armstrong Tr. at 219-20, 1331-32; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 34. 
72 Armstrong Tr. at 413-14. 
73 !Q. at 352, 358, 819. See also Damm Tr. at 30; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 61. 
74 Armstrong Tr. at 352. See also !Q.. at 353, 361, 362. 
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Moreover, Martinez's direct dealings with program directors makes Contract 
Management staff feel excluded from the process, and creates the impression that deals have been 
struck at the top of the agency and that staff are simply supposed to process the paperwork. 75 
Thus, objective decision-making becomes difficult. 76 The problem is exacerbated as the program 
directors come to believe that they are not accountable to Contract Management and do not have 
to follow the usual rules and procedures. 77 
Staff who insist on following procedures or raising questions about a program are 
viewed as creating roadblocks and are sharply rebuked or, like Debye-Saxinger, isolated by Marti-
nez.78 Thus "sent to Siberia," the staff member feels outcast, useless and anxious whether his or 
her work has any effect. 79 When the outside treatment community learns that a contract manager 
is in disfavor, they skirt that manager, increasing the sense of isolation. 80 
Not surprisingly, on projects where the Director has a particular interest or 
personal relationship with the program director, Contract Management staff members are afraid to 
ask questions or insist on procedures and feel that their authority and even their positions are at 
risk.81 In such circumstances, staff would rather wait for someone else to raise the question or 
objection. 82 Indeed, Chief Counsel Damm has heard from Contract Management staff expressions 
such as "you have got to stop putting roadblocks here, Julio wants this funded" and "the Director 
wants this moved along, so don't give it so much attention."83 
The rivalry between Martinez and Debye-Saxinger has similar adverse effects on 
agency staff. Not only does Martinez deprive himself of the benefit ofDebye-Saxinger's judgment, 
75 Id . at 44, 821-23. See also Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 61. 
76 Armstrong Tr. at 352. 
77 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 102-03. See also Armstrong Tr. at 354-55, 819. 
78 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 28-30, 62, 2_10, 211-12, 218, 378. See also Damm Tr. at 13-14; Armstrong Tr. at 1329-30, 1332-
33 . 
79 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 76-77. See also !Q. at 78 and 211-12; Damm Tr. at 76. 
80 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 76-77. Some staff sometimes attempt "to take advantage of the fact that someone may be out 
of the information flow for a while, and deliberately keep them out, try to push forward projects that they know they might not 
be easily dealt with on." Damm Tr. at 24. 
81 Damm Tr. at 24-25, 59-60, 75-76. See also Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 74-76, 375, 377, 378; Armstrong Tr. at 1340. 
82 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 75. 
83 Damm Tr. at 17, 20. 
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but sometimes Debye,Saxinger withholds his input deliberately. Apparently believing that he 
could resolve agency problems if he were the Director, he instead keeps his ideas to himself, once 
saying to Armstrong "'I think that I have the deus ex machina solution to this problem, but I'm not 
going to tell you.'"84 
Moreover, staff feels caught between the two and must be careful not to appear to 
be taking sides in the rivalry. After Debye,Saxinger promoted Armstrong to Downstate Chief of 
Contract Management, Armstrong had to be careful not to seem to be taking Debye,Saxinger's 
side in a disagreement with the Director.85 Likewise, Chief Counsel Damm's ability to approach 
Martinez about issues can be affected by whether the Director perceive.s her as siding with Debye, 
Saxinger. 86 
84 Armstrong Tr. at 236-37. 
85 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 152-53. 
86 Damm Tr. at 13, 17-18. 
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II. LA NUEV A RAZA INSTITUTE/YOUNG ADULTS IN TRANSITION CENTER 
A. Introduction And Summary 
Rafael Cantellops is the founder and Executive Director of La N ueva Raza Institute 
("LNRI") ,87 an ambulatory drug,free treatment program which has received at least $2.2 million in 
DSAS funding since it was created in February 1981. 88 
Since its inception, the program has been plagued with serious problems, many of 
which Contract Management staff attribute to Cantellops' poor administrative skills. From the 
outset, Martinez was kept informed of the program's poor performance, Cantellops' shortcomings 
and the many difficulties experienced by DSAS and LNRI staff in working with him. Nevertheless, 
in 1985 Martinez committed additional DSAS funds to LNRI to enable Cantellops to develop and 
operate a residential treatment program called the Young Adults in Transition Center (''YA TC"). 
Because DSAS endorsed YA TC, the New York State Department of Social 
Services ("DSS") co,sponsored and committed $800,000 to the project. However, because of 
DSS' dissatisfaction with YATC's progress, it never disbursed any of the committed funds. DSAS 
was also dissatisfied and terminated its support in June 1989, having spent $973,525 on the project 
and anticipating that it would have to spend at least another $687,123 before the program could 
open its doors.89 
Martinez's decision to fund LNRI, his abiding tolerance of its poor performance, 
and his decision to fund YA TC are attributable, at least in part, to his longstanding relationship 
with Cantellops. 
87 Cantellops Tr. at 2-3. 
88 See LNRI Monthly Statement of Expenditures, June 1982; LNRI Monthly Statement of Expenditures, June 1983; LNRI 
Monthly Statement of Expenditures, June 1984 (these statements, submitted by LNRI for the last month of each funding period, 
contain cumulative expenditure data for the entire contract year). DSAS did not provide LNRI expenditure statements for 
February 1981 ·June 1981, during which period LNRI had a $75,000 contract with DSAS. Expenditures for the years July 
1984 • March 1989 are taken from summary information provided to the Commission by DSAS. 
89 See Memorandum to Michael Dowling from Gerard Armstrong, dated June 29, 1989. 
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B. Director Martinez's Relationship With Rafael Cantellops 
Martinez first met Cantellops in 1966 or 1967 at Manhattan General Hospital, 
where Martinez was in a drug rehabilitation program.90 Cantellops, himself a rehabilitated addict, 
was then working for an earlier incarnation of the now defunct New Yark City Addiction Services 
Agency ("ASA").91 
After Martinez left Manhattan General in 1967, he helped establish Phoenix 
House.92 Cantellops, still employed by ASA, saw Martinez during visits _to Phoenix House.93 
During that period, Cantellops considered Martinez one of his proteges and Martinez viewed 
Cantellops as his mentor.94 
In 1969, Martinez left Phoenix House and went to work at ASA. Martinez and 
Cantellops began to socialize. Among other things, they and their families took some vacations 
together.95 However, their social activities became less frequent when Martinez left ASA in 1970 
to establish Project Retum.96 Their relationship became more active in 1974 or 1975 but slowed 
down again in 1978 or 1979.97 Since then, they have continued to socialize from time to time.98 
Martinez still regards Cantellops as a friend.99 According to Cantellops, every time 
the two of them meet Martinez expresses gratitude to Cantellops for having helped him kick his 
drug habit. 100 Cantellops believes that he helped Martinez get to where he is today. 101 
90 Martinez Tr. at 420-21; Cantellops Tr. at 18. 
91 Martinez Tr. at 421 ; Cantellops Tr. at 7-8. 
92 Martinez Tr. at 423. 
93 !Q. at 422. 
94 Cantellops Tr. at 17-18; Martinez Tr. at 429. 
95 Martinez Tr. at 424-25. 
96 !Q. at 426, 432; Cantellops Tr. at 19. 
97 Martinez Tr. at 427. 
98 Cantellops Tr. at 22-23. 
99 Martinez Tr. at 429. 
100 Cantellops Tr. at 24, 61. 
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C. The Origins Of LNRI 
Sometime in 1980, after Cantellops had left ASA, he contacted DSAS about 
funding for a drug program by phoning Martinez. 102 That Fall he followed up with a letter to 
Martinez, proposing to establish an "attitudinal" training program. 103 
In response, Martinez met with Cantellops in early October 1980 and referred him 
to DSAS' training department. 104 The department informed Cantellops that no funds were 
available for the type of project he proposed. 105 Cantellops and Martinez then set up a second 
meeting at which Martinez personally rejected Cantellops' proposal for the same reason. 106 During 
that meeting, Martinez recommended that Cantellops instead start either a treatment or a 
prevention/education program for youth. 107 Cantellops proposed a residential program, but 
Martinez persuaded him to begin with a less ambitious ambulatory program. 108 
Thereafter, Martinez received a new proposal from Cantellops that, according to 
Martinez, "made a little more sense."109 He forwarded the proposal to Debye-Saxinger, who was 
then Deputy Director of Contract Management. 110 Martinez personally introduced Debye-
Saxinger to Cantellops, telling him: "help these people get a program started." 111 At Martinez's 
lOl IQ. at 17-18. 
102 Martinez Tr. at 427, 433. 
103 Cantellops Tr. at 126. Cantellops testified that he wanted Martinez to help him with his plans. IQ. 
l04 Martinez Tr. at 434, 437-38; Cantellops Tr. at 17, 24-25, 127-28. 
l05 Martinez Tr. at 438, 458-59; Cantellops Tr. at 127-28. 
l06 Cantellops Tr. at 131; Martinez Tr. at 438-39, 444, 457. Martinez testified that the proposal "wasn't worth fifty cents.• 
Martinez Tr. at 437-38. 
l07 Martinez 'fr. at 435. However, later in his testimony Martinez denied making such a recommendation. IQ. at 447, 
456-57. . 
10~ Armstrong Tr. at 366-67, 462. 
109 Martinez Tr. at 443-44. 
l IO IQ. at 444-45. 
111 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 456, 458. Cantellops made no reference to Debye-Saxinger in his testimony regarding the appli-
cation process. According to him, Martinez told him to meet with Armstrong, and either Martinez or Armstrong told him that 
he would have to submit a new proposal for a program to provide services to children. Cantellops Tr. at 25-27, 33. Shortly 
thereafter, he submitted his LNRI proposal which he developed with assistance from DSAS staff. IQ. at 33-34. 
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request, Debye,Saxinger guided Cantellops through the early part of the application process and 
generally advocated for the program. 112 
However, friction arose between Cantellops and Debye,Saxinger because 
Cantellops acted as if Martinez had already committed DSAS funds to LNRI and Debye,Saxinger 
was simply supposed to rubber,stamp and implement the decision. 113 At the same time, Martinez 
also became wary that Debye,Saxinger, who had a reputation as a "fairly hard,nosed contract 
manager," was applying his "strict" approach toward LNRI. 114 Consequently, Martinez transferred 
responsibility for the program to Armstrong, who was then Downstate Chief of Contract 
Management. 115 Debye,Saxinger remembers LNRI a.S the first time that Martinez distrusted his 
handling of a program. 116 
Martinez remained personally involved in his friend's proposal. He told Armstrong 
that a funding application would be coming from Cantellops; that he had already met with 
Cantellops and knew him; and that Armstrong should let him know if the proposal was sound 
because he was interested in doing something for the Hispanic community in Queens. 117 
Martinez's strong personal interest in funding Cantellops was not lost on Armstrong. 118 After 
reviewing the application himself, Armstrong agreed to provide Cantellops with a start,up contract 
to develop LNRI. 119 
l 12 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 459-61. 
113 !Q. at 458. 
ll4 !Q. at 253 . 
115 !Q. at 457-58. 
116 !Q. at 457. 
117 Armstrong Tr. at 365. 
118 !Q. at 373-74, 427. 
119 !Q. at 3 74, 427. Armstrong testified that from the day he met Cantellops, he knew that LNRI was going to need a lot 
of anention. Id. at 375, 427. Therefore, and because of Martinez's interest in the program, Armstrong hand-picked Gerard 
Houser to be LNRI's contract manager, knowing him to be capable. !Q. at 375-76. 
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D. The First Year Of LNRI's Operations 
DSAS began funding LNRI in February 1981. Between then and June 1982 the 
program was allocated $319 ,000120 to pay for start-up costs such as site location, equipment and 
salaries. 121 
However, LNRI's start-up period, particularly site selection, dragged on for an 
"exorbitant amount of time."122 Cantellops was permitted to operate LNRI from his apartment for 
most of the first year, although "Contract Management was uncomfortable with that and ... 
Houser [the contract manager] was pushing him, almost daily to find a location to begin opera-
tions." 123 After eleven months, LNRI finally moved to its rented program site on Crescent Street, 
Long Island City. 124 
E. Martinez Overrules Contract 
Management's Decision To De-Fund LNRI 
In early July 1982, Armstrong put LNRI on probation because the program had not 
yet served a single client and was suffering from extraordinarily high staff tumover. 125 After 
informing Martinez, Armstrong gave Cantellops two months to improve the client census at LNRI 
and "to establish within the program and its current employees an atmosphere which is conducive 
to the succes.c;ful treatment of clients."126 
120 Contract between DSAS and LNRI for February l, 1981 , June 30, 1981, and three amendments thereto. LNRl's 
actual expenditures are more difficult to determine. DSAS did not produce any documents showing LNRI's actual expenditures 
during the period February 1981 ·June 1981. LNRl's monthly statement of expenditures for June 1982, containing cumulative 
information for the period July 1981 - June 1982, indicate that it spent approximately $283,000 during that contract year. A 
memorandum to Julio Martinez from John Randall and Gerard Armstrong, dated September 23, 1982, indicates that by June 
30, 1982, LNRI had spent $367,250. 
121 Houser Tr. at 29-32. 
122 !Q. at 21. 
123 Armstrong Tr. at 377-78; Cantellops Tr. at 35-36. 
124 Cantellops Tr. at 36; Armstrong Tr. at 378. 
125 Memorandum to Contract Management staff member Vernon Sylvester from Gerard Houser, dated September 23, 1982. 
LNRI did not begin reporting client census to DSAS until July 1982. !Q. "Client census" is the number of clients actually 
attending the program. Griffin Tr. at 116-19. 
126 Armstrong Tr. at 380. DSAS did not provide the Commission with Armstrong's letter. The quoted text is from a later 
DSAS memorandum that quotes the letter. Memorandum to Vernon Sylvester from Gerard Houser, dated September 23, 1982, 
p. 1. 
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·-LNRI did not improve during the probation period. 127 During the entire two-
month probationary period, LNRI served only three clients. 128 Further, at least three out of six 
staff members resigned in late July 1982. 129 
Because the probation period was due to expire in September 1982 when Martinez 
would be on vacation, John Randall, then First Deputy Director, consulted with Martinez about 
LNRI before he left. 130 Martinez told him to take appropriate action if LNRI did not meet DSAS 
standards. 131 Randall, Debye-Saxinger, Armstrong and Houser all agreed that the program should 
be de-funded because of its extremely low client census and extremely high staff turnover rate. 132 
On September 23, 1982, while Martinez was still on vacation, a letter was sent to 
Cantell ops stating that DSAS would discontinue funding LNRI. 133 Because of Martinez's special 
relationship to the program, Armstrong and Randall believed that it was important to terminate 
funding while Martinez was still away; otherwise, they believed, Martinez would have kept funding 
the program despite his pre-vacation instructions. 134 
127 Armstrong Tr. at 381. 
128 Memorandum to Vernon Sylvester from Gerard Houser, dated September 23, 1982. 
129 The three staff members complained of, among other things, "deplorable and inhumane working conditions" and nonpay-
ment of wages. They went to DSAS offices to register their complaints with Martinez personally. Memorandum to the Board 
of Directors of LNRI from Haydee N. Colon, Martha Torres and Carmen Palomino, dated July 30, 1982, p. 3; Memorandum 
to Vernon Sylvester from Gerard Houser, dated September 23, 1982; Martinez Tr. at 466-67, 482-83 . 
l30 Houser Tr. at 36-37 ; Armstrong Tr. at 381-82; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 482-83; Randall Tr. at 10. At first, Martinez 
testified that he was "well aware" that LNRI had been placed on probation, Martinez Tr. at 482-83, but then he testified that 
he did not remember that the program was on probation, that he was away on vacation in Hawaii in September 1982, or that 
Randall had spoken to him about the program before he left. !Q.. at 491-93. 
131 Randall Tr. at 10. 
132 !Q.. at 10, 21; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 481-82; Armstrong Tr. at 381; Houser Tr. at 38-40, 47. See also Memorandum 
to Norwig Debye-Saxinger from Gerard Armstrong, dated September 22, 1982; Memorandum to Vernon Sylvester from Gerard 
Houser, dated September 23, 1982; Memorandum to Julio Martinez from John Randall and Gerard Armstrong, dated September 
23, 1982. These documents show that LNRI had a staff turnover rate of 230%, and a counselor position turnover rate of 360%, 
during its first 20 months of operation. 
133 Lener to Rafael Cantellops from Julio Martinez, dated September 23, 1982. Although the letter was sent out in 
Maninez's name, Martinez did not actually sign it. Martinez Tr. at 493-95. 
134 Armstrong Tr. at 389, 432. 
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Martinez returned a few days after the letter was sent and almost immediately met 
with Angelo Giordani, Chairman of LNRI's Board of Directors. 135 Then, on September 28, 1982, 
Martinez met with Cantellops, with Armstrong present, and informed Cantellops that he was 
going to continue LNRI's funding and give the program until December 15, 1982 to build an 
acceptable client census. 136 
Martinez's revival of LNRI had a major and lasting impact on DSAS staff at all 
levels. 137 Randall was furious at Martinez for overruling him and rescuing an unworthy 
program. 138 This episode impaired Randall's ability to manage DSAS and was a factor in his 
decision to leave the agency the following May. 139 
Armstrong believed that extending the probation period was, at best, a temporary 
solution, since, as far as he was concerned, the essential problem at LNRI was Cantellops him, 
self. 140 Nevertheless, he resigned himself to Martinez's rescue of the program as "a fact of life." 141 
He has never again formally recommended that DSAS de,fund LNRI's ambulatory program, 
despite continued poor performance, because he does not believe that Martinez would support 
him. 142 Nor does Armstrong believe that Martinez would seek Cantellops' removal because 
Martinez sees the program as Cantellops' ''baby" and wants to keep him there.143 
LNRI's contract manager also made no subsequent de,funding recommendations, 
because he realized that LNRI was a "fait accompli ... We were going to have LNRl."144 Even Bill 
Griffin, who did not have any responsibility for LNRI until four years after the incident, thought 
l35 !Q. at 389-91. Giordani was Chairman of LNRI's Board from its inception until December 1986. Giordani Tr. at 20-
21 . He and Martinez have known each other since childhood. !Q. at 8. 
136 Martinez Tr. at 495-96. Martinez testified that he was unaware that the termination letter had been sent or that he 
was effectively reversing his staffs decision. !Q. at 493-97. 
137 See, £.:.[:, Houser Tr. at 47, 66, 71-72. 
138 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 483-85 . . 
139 Randall Tr. at 5-6, 9-10. 
140 Armstrong Tr. at 436-39. 
141 !Q. 
142 !Q. at 314, 345 . However, Armstrong has continued to inform Martinez that the problems with LNRI are serious and 
has suggested that DSAS consider not doing business with Cantellops. !Q. at 344-45. 
143 !Q. at 349-51 . 
144 Houser Tr. at 63-64. 
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that any decision to de,fund LNRI "would probably fall on deaf ears," because of the relationship 
between Cantellops and Martinez. 145 As a consequence of that r~lationship and the staff's 
perception of it, LNRI has been treated more leniently than other programs. 146 
F. LNRI's Continuing Problems 
The problems which prompted Contract Management to recommend de,funding 
LNRI in 1982 persisted after Martinez revived the program. While client census increased in the 
last few months of 1982, it dropped again in the following year. 147 LNRI's census has continued to 
fluctuate, occasionally reaching satisfactory levels, but then always falling below standard. 148 
Since 1986, LNRI has reported an average monthly·censµs of 30. 7 clients, 77% of 
the program's contract capacity of 40. 149 This is significantly below the 90% rate that DSAS _ 
considers to be the minimum acceptable, at a time when most programs are over capacity and have 
waiting lists. 150 
Moreover, LNRI's reported client census, as poor as it has been, may well be 
inflated. DSAS' on,site reviews of LNRI's client records since 1986 revealed that the program 
improperly included a number of clients in its monthly census reports. 151 Moreover, even the 
inaccurate census reports understate LNRI's under,utilization, since in preparing the reports the 
program relied on DSAS rules which permit counting as active any client who appears at the 
program just once during the 30 days prior to the report. 152 According to Armstrong and Debye, 
145 Griffin Tr. at 475. 
l46 Annsrrong Tr. at 351-52. 
l47 !Q. at 440. 
148 !Q. at 439-40; Rendon Tr. at 27-29. 
149 Memorandum to Jose Rendon from Ivan Garcia, dated May 11, 1989, p. I. 
ISO IQ.; Martinez Tr. at 516-17; Deming Tr. at 52, 54; DSAS Policy and Procedure Manual for Service Providers, Item 
3300.2(B), dated April 1986. 
151 Memorandum to Jose Rendon from Ivan Garcia, dated May 11, 1989. For example, some clients reported by the 
program had no history of substance abuse. !Q. See also Memorandum to William J. Griffin from Jose Rendon, dated June 2, 
1987. 
152 Annsrrong Tr. at 295 . DSAS Policy and Procedure Manual for Service Providers, Item 3300.2(B), dated April 1986. 
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Saxinger, an effective treatment regimen mandates client attendance three to four times per 
week. 153 
Staff problems also persisted at LNRI. In early 1984, LNRI staff again made written 
allegations reciting numerous irregularities at the program. 154 At Armstrong's request, DSAS' 
Bureau of Field Audit and Program Review ("F APR") investigated the allegations and issued a 
written report. 155 F AP R's investigation, for the most part, was limited only to a review of docu, 
mentary evidence which did not verify most of the allegations. 156 F APR did find evidence that 
Cantellops' took a trip to Puerto Rico at program expense which was unauthorized and unrelated 
to program business. l57 
Armstrong was concerned about the allegations; he believed they were another 
"smoke signal" that something was amiss at LNRI. 158 He told Martinez about Cantellops' "inability 
to run a good program;" the ineffectiveness of Cantellops' "confrontational approach" to drug 
rehabilitation; and Cantellops' preference for Hispanic staff and clients, which contributed to the 
program's low client census. 159 Martinez's usual response was that DSAS needs the services and 
has to do more to help Cantellops. 160 
However, Cantellops has continually resisted Contract Management staff's efforts, 
preferring to work directly with Martinez. 161 Four of the five Contract Management staff who 
testified about LNRI or YA TC recalled incidents where Cantellops went over their heads to 
153 Armstrong Tr. at 296; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 472-73. 
154 Similar to the earlier allegations, staff charged Cantellops ~th. among other things, "intimidation," "humiliation and 
embarrassment" of staff, threatening non-payment of wages, and misuse of program funds. Statement of Grievances and Concerns 
submitted by Julio Gerena, Carlos Martinez and Luis LaBoy, pp. 2-3. See also Memorandum to Gerry Armstrong from Neil C. 
Grogin, dated March 22, 1984. 
155 Armstrong Tr. at 444. 
l56 Memorandum to Gerry Armstrong from Neil C. Grogin, dated March 22, 1984. 
157 Id., p. 4. 
l58 Armstrong Tr. at 31, 452. Initially, Martinez testified that he knew nothing about these allegations, notwithstanding 
that he was listed as a recipient of FAPR's report. Martinez Tr. at 519-21. Upon further examination, however, he admitted 
that he had heard about the trip to Puerto Rico. !Q. at 521, 523. He testified that he would have closed the program down 
if Cancellops had misused state funds. !Q. at 521. 
159 Armstrong Tr. at 297-305, 341-43. 
l60 !Q. at 341-42, 345-46; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 478. 
161 Armstrong Tr. at 42'43, 344. 
41 
Martinez, or at least threatened to do so. 162 Contract Management staff has had difficulty holding 
·-Cantell ops accountable, because he can deal directly with Martinez rather than his contract 
manager. 163 By allowing Cantellops to do so, Martinez himself undermines Contract 
Management's authority. 164 
G. Martinez Commits Additional DSAS Funds 
To LNRl's Young Adults In Transition Center (''YATC") 
In 1985, notwithstanding LNRI's fluctuating census, staff complaints, and two 
recent negative F APR reports, 165 Martinez committed additional DSAS funds to LNRI, so that it 
could run a residential drug treatment program. 
1. Cantellops Applies For lilIAP Funds 
From The Department Of Social Services 
In the first half of 1985, Cantellops approached Martinez directly,, as he had in· 
1980 ,, to request additional funding to start a residential program. 166 Martinez told Cantellops 
that DSAS didn't have capital funds available and suggested that he apply to DSS, which had 
issued an RFP under its Homeless Housing and Assistance Program ("HHAP"). 167 Through 
HHAP, DSS grants capital monies to service providers for site acquisition and renovation, on the 
condition that the grantee has secured a funding commitment for operating expenses from a sister 
agency such as DSAS.168 By June 1985, Cantell ops submitted his application to DSS, proposing 
that LNRI be granted additional funds to set up YA TC, a residential treatment program targeting 
162 See, ~. Rendon Tr. at 88-89; Armstrong Tr. at 343-44, 459, 464; Griffin Tr. at 56-59; Deming Tr. at 592-97. 
Houser, the fifth Contract Management staff member to testify about LNRI, was not asked to address this is.sue at his private 
hearing. 
163 See,~. Armstrong Tr. at 344. 
164 See, ~. Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 542. 
l65 Jn May 1985, FAPR conducted a comprehensive review of LNRI. A final repon is.sued by FAPR in September 1985 
contains numerous references to LNRl's failure to comply with DSAS regulations-regarding client treatment and fiscal systems. 
A prior FAPR repon is.sued in February 1985 also documented failures by LNRI to adhere to DSAS regulations in the treatment 
of clients and the administration of the program. 
166 Maninez Tr. at 529-30; LNRI Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, dated June 5, 1985. 
167 Maninez Tr. at 530, 543. 
168 lQ. at 550-51. 
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homeless Hispanic youth. 169 
2. Martinez Supports Funding For YATC 
Martinez committed DSAS funds for YA TC's operating costs without consulting 
Contract Management staff. 170 In the Summer of 1985, while Armstrong was on vacation, 
Martinez approached Carl Deming, Downstate Chief of Contract Management and instructed him 
to send a letter to DSS indicating that DSAS would provide operational funds to LNRI for 
YATC. 171 
Deming's July 1, 1985 letter gave Y ATC preferential treatment over other service 
providers competing for the same DSS funds in two respects: it was sent earlier than DSAS letters 
in support of other programs and, unlike the other letters, it contained an explicit DSAS funding 
commitment. 172 Based on DSAS' support and DSS' evaluation of the program's proposal, DSS 
originally committed $700,000, and later an additional $100,000, to YATC. 173 
Armstrong testified that it was unusual for Martinez to bypass him on a funding 
question, and that neither he nor Deming thought that DSAS should fund Y ATC, given LNRI's 
poor track record. 174 Deming testified that if Martinez had solicited his opinion on Y ATC, he 
would have told him to replace Cantellops with another program director and inform DSS of 
DSAS' problems with LNRI. 175 However, Deming did not voice any opposition to Martinez at this 
169 LNRI Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, dated June 5, 1985. 
l70 Martinez Tr. at 548. 
l7l Deming Tr. at 545, 612-13. Minutes from the LNRI Board of Directors meeting on June 5, 1985, indicate that Marti-
nez had made a commitment to Cantellops to provide funds for YA TC even before he spoke to Deming. 
l72 Compare Letter "To Whom .It M~y Concern• from Carleton Deming, dated July l, 1985, With Letter to Nancy Travers 
from Rick Herr, dated August 15, 1985 (in re: Enter, Inc.); Letter to Nancy Travers from Rick Herr, dated August 15, 1985 
(in re: Camelot Counseling Center and Reality House, Inc.); Letter to Nancy Travers from Rick Herr, dated August 15, 1985 
(in re: Hale House Center for the Promotion of Human Potential); Letter to Nancy Travers from Rick Herr, dated August 15, 
1985 (in re: Volunteers of America). 
173 Homeless Housing And As.5istance Program 1985 Evaluation Form: Young Adults in Transition Center, pp. 1-2; 
Memorandum to Gerard Annstrong from Carl Deming, dated November 23, 1987. 
174 Armstrong Tr. at 315, 480-82. Armstrong speculated that Martinez might have by-passed him because Martinez an-
ticipated his opposition. Id. at 463, 482. 




H. Y ATC's Persistent Problems 
Because of numerous problems, YA TC never began operations and DSAS 
terminated funding for the project in June 1989 .177 
1. Cantellops' Inability To Raise Necessary Funds 
Y ATC failed to attract other sources of revenue necessary to fund the project. In 
May 1986, the cost of purchasing and renovating the first program site identified by Cantellops was 
estimated at $2.4 million. 178 Since at that time DSS had committed only $700,000 in capital funds, 
and DSAS anticipated providing funds only for the program's operating costs, additional funding 
sources had to be found to enable YATC to secure and renovate a program site. 179 
DSAS hoped that other agencies would provide the needed funds, but Armstrong 
believed they would not if they were as familiar with Cantellops as DSAS was. 180 Ultimately, 
Cantellops failed to attract any significant funding from other agencies. 181 Since a complete 
funding package was a prerequisite to the release of DSS funds, and because of other difficulties, 
DSS refused to disburse any funds for YA TC. 182 
176 !Q. at 619-20. Armstrong's testimony is equivocal as to whether and when he may have expressed reservations about 
funding YATC. Armstrong Tr. at 475, 480-81. 
177 Letter to Andrew Schulz from Gerard Armstrong, dated August 2, 1989; Letter to Rafael Cantellops from Gerard 
Armstrong, dated July 14, 1989; Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Jose Rendon, dated June 29, 1982; Memorandum 
to Julio Martinez from Gerard Armstrong, dated June 22, 1989; Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Carl Deming, dated 
June 20, 1989. 
l7S Letter to Nancy Travers from Rafael Cantellops, dated May 12, 1986, p. 2. 
179 Armstrong Tr. at 492; Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Carl Deming, dated April 28, 1987. 
180 Armstrong Tr. at 491-92. 
181 !Q. at 547. Letter to Rafael Cantellops from Gerard Armstrong, dated July 14, 1989; Memorandum to Gerard 
Armstrong from Jose Rendon, dated June 29, 1989. 
1S2 Memorandum to Michael Dowling from Gerard Armstrong, dated June 29, 1989. See Memorandum to Gerard 
Armstrong from Carl Deming, dated November 23 , 1987, pp. 2-3 . 
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2. Cantellops Alienates His Board Of Directors 
Since 1986, LNRI has not had an effective Board of Directors to oversee Cantel-
lops. 183 As early as 1985, Giordani and others on the board became largely inactive. 184 Giordani 
testified that he had become increasingly frustrated with Cantellops' operating without board 
authority. 185 For example, he testified that Cantellops failed to notify the board when he applied 
for HHAP funds for Y ATC in 1985. 186 The last straw for Giordani, prompting his alienation from 
LNRI, came in 1986 when Cantellops signed an agreement without board authority to buy a 
building for YA TC. 187 
Giordani then sought Cantellops' removal. 188 In December 1986, the board split 
over the issue, with the result that several members, including Giordani, left the board. 189 After 
that, according to Armstrong, LNRI's board was only "a paper" one. 190 
3. Delays In Finding And Renovating A Site 
After several unsuccessful efforts, LNRI finally secured a site for YA TC in August 
1987, entering into a long-term lease for a building which it had previously sought to purchase. 191 
183 Armstrong Tr. at 291 . Armstrong views a strong Board of Directors or a strong administrator as critical to any possible 
success of this program. !Q. at 291, 329. 
184 Id. at 519-20. 
185 Giordani Tr. at 99. 
186 Id. at 72. 
187 !Q. at 33-34, 90-91. 
188 !Q. at 91 -92, 98. 
189 !Q. at 34, 98; Rendon Tr. at 48, 50-51. 
190 Armstrong Tr. at 531. Memorandum to Carl Deming from Jose Rendon, dated May 18, 1989. In 1987, DSAS 
discovered that Cantellops had been a member of his own Board of Directors since 1981, in violation of DSAS regulations. He 
was required to step down. Rendon Tr. at 40-42, 47-49. Cantellops testified that there are only two Board members at LNRI, 
notwithstanding a DSAS stipulation that there be at least five. Cantellops Tr. at 193; Rendon Tr. at 48. Contract Management 
staff was unaware of this situation until Commission staff brought it to their attention during their private hearings. ~ ~. 
Griffin Tr. at 12-13. 
191 Rendon Tr. at 67-68; "Briefing Paper" prepared by National Management Analysts, dated August 24, 1987. 
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Renovation of the site was then delayed by the shortage of funds and numerous failures by the 
·-program architect to submit required plans and information. 192 
Then, in the Spring of 1989, DSAS discovered that the architect, hired by 
Cantellops in 1986 without competitive bidding or an RFP, was unacceptable, because he was in 
fact an interior designer. 193 As a result, a new architect had to be found and new estimates 
obtained. The new architect indicated that the cost of renovations would be substantially higher, 
rendering an earlier estimate of the program's funding shortfall "dated and grossly inaccurate."194 
4. Cantellops' Resistance To Supervision By Contract Management 
Contract Management staff concluded that Cantellops needed extensive 
supervision in administrating YA TC if it was to become a viable program, and the staff "spent an 
inordinate amount of time" working to help the program. 195 However, as with the ambulatory 
program, in administering YA TC, Cantellops resisted both the advice and the authority of 
Contract Management. 196 There were numerous conflicts between Cantellops and DSAS staff 
over such issues as the architect, retention of consultants, and the financing of Y ATC. 197 
For example, in December 1987, Cantellops refused to follow a cash management 
plan devised by Contract Management staff to help him cope with his shortage of funds. 198 At the 
time, YA TC owed four months rent on the program site, the landlord was threatening to dissolve 
the lease agreement, and the program had numerous other debts about to become due. 199 
192 Griffin Tr. at 74. ~~.Letter to Rafael Cantellops from Jose R. Rendon, dated December 9, 1988; Letter to Rafael 
Cantellops from Jose R. Rendon, dated September 21, 1988; Letter to John Grover from Stanley Buczek, dated September 23, 
1988; Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Jose R. Rendon, dated September 22, 1988; Memorandum to William Griffin 
from Nick Cristo, dated April 6, 1988. 
193 Rendon Tr. at 102-05. 
194 Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Jose Rendon, dated June 29, 1989. 
195 See,~. Armstrong Tr. at 291, 329; Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Carl Deming, dated November 23, 1987, 
p. 3; Griffin Tr. at 97-98; Rendon Tr. at 18-20. 
196 Rendon Tr. at 17-20; Giordani Tr. at 37-38. 
197 See, ~. Armstrong Tr. at 478-79, 516-18; Rendon Tr. at 19-20, 101-04; Griffin Tr. 39-41. 
198 Letter to Rafael Cantellops from Gerard Armstrong, dated December 9, 1987; Memorandum to Julio A. Martinez from 
Nick Cristo and Carl Deming, dated December 2, 1987. 
199 Memorandum to Julio A. Martinez from Nick Cristo and Carl Deming, dated December 2, 1987. 
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Armstrong admonished Cantellops for wasting his, Martinez's and Contract Management staff's 
time, and warned that YA TC would fail for lack of funds if he did not follow instructions. 200 
I. Martinez's Continuing Support For 
YATC Over Contract Management's Objections 
Contract Management staff's lack of confidence in Cantellops' ability grew. 
Numerous documents describe the staff's increasing dissatisfaction and frustration with YA TC's 
lack of progress.201 Yet, despite his staffs recommendations to the contrary, Martinez continued to 
support funding for the project. 
For example, in the Spring of 1987, Cantellops requested $235,000 from DSAS to 
cover various Y ATC expenses.202 Deming wrote to Armstrong strongly urging that DSAS deny 
the funds.203 Jose Rendon, then contract manager of LNRI and YA TC, concurred in this 
judgment, as did Bill Griffin, then Regional Supervisor.204 Nevertheless, soon thereafter the funds 
were authorized. 205 
In November 1987, DSAS estimated that the cost of developing the program 
would exceed existing DSAS and DSS funding commitments by $350,000.206 Contract 
Management staff, including Armstrong, was unanimous that DSAS should not provide the 
money, even though that would preclude the release of DSS funds and ensure the demise of the 
200 Letter to Rafael Cantellops from Gerard Armstrong, dated December 9, 1987. 
20! See,~. Memorandum to Carl Deming from Jose Rendon, dated May 16, 1989; Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong 
from Jose R. Rendon, dated September 22, 1988; Letter to Rafael Cantellops from Jose R. Rendon, dated September 21, 1988; 
Memorandum to William Griffin from Nick Cristo, dated April 6, 1988; Letter to Rafael Cantellops from Gerard Armstrong, 
dated December 9, 1987; Memorandum.to Gerard Armstrong from Carl Deming, dated November 23, 1987; Memorandum to 
Gerard Armstrong from Carl Demil)g, dated April 28, 1987. 
202 Letter to Carl Deming from Rafael Cantellops, dated May 12, 1987; Deming Tr. at 628-31. 
203 Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Carl Deming, dated April 28, 1987. 
204 Rendon Tr. at 72-76; Griffin Tr. at 44-45. 
205 Armstrong Tr. at 542-47. Armstrong has no clear recollection of the discussions leading to DSAS' decision to commit 
these funds to YA TC, but testified that he would not have authorized the funds without first discussing the decision with 
Martinez or Debye-Saxinger. !Q. 




After YA TC was refused additional funding by Contract Management, Cantellops 
and Martinez met, at Cantellops' request, in Albany at the end of November 1987.208 At that 
meeting, Martinez gave Cantellops his oral commitment that DSAS would provide the $350,000 
and called DSS Commissioner Cesar Perales to so advise him in the hope of triggering the release 
of that agency's funds. 209 
Martinez did not advise Contract Management staff that he had committed 
additional DSAS funds for YATC. Rendon first learned of the commitment from Cantellops.210 
Although Armstrong knew of the November meeting, he was not aware that Martinez had made a 
funding commitment at that time until he was shown documentary evidence of it by Commission 
staff.211 
In fact, as late as January 1988, Armstrong was led to believe that a commitment to 
provide the $350,000 had not yet been made. At that time, Armstrong participated in a telephone 
conference with Martinez and Debye,Saxinger during which the merits of the funding 
commitment were discll.&5ed as though the issue was still unresolved. Armstrong adamantly 
opposed providing the funds. Debye,Saxinger and Martinez proposed that DSAS not provide the 
funds but, in order to trigger the release of DSS funds, tell DSS that DSAS would do so.212 
Armstrong objected, stating that the funds would have to be provided if the commitment was to be 
made.213 
Nevertheless, Debye,Saxinger directed Armstrong to send a commitment letter to 
Cantellops.214 Armstrong directed Deming to write the letter, hoping that he might be able to 
207 Griffin Tr. at 32-38; Armstrong Tr. at 548; Rendon Tr. at 80-85. Martinez has no recollection of Armstrong's opposition 
to DSAS committing additional monies to close YATC's funding gap. Martinez Tr. at 560. To the contrary, Martinez testified 
that Armstrong advised him to provide the $350,000. !f!.. at 559-60. 
208 Martinez Tr. at 555-56. 
209 !f!.. at 555-59. 
210 Rendon Tr. at 89, 95. 
211 Armstrong Tr. at 571-78. 
212 !f!.. at 555-59; Martinez Tr. at 560-62. 
213 Martinez Tr. at 558-59. 
214 !f!.. at 555. 
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"overrule" Deming if he could later convince Martinez and Debye-Saxinger that it was wrong to 
make a sham commitment.215 
The ploy to persuade DSS to release its funds did not succeed, although following 
receipt of DSAS' commitment letter DSS finalized its contract with LNRI for YA TC and obtained 
approval from the State Division of Budget. 216 By the time that approval was obtained in 
September 1988, the chronic problems with YA TC's architect, as well as other concerns about the 
program, caused DSS again to withhold its funds.217 
J. DSAS Terminates YATC's Funding 
Because of the program's increased costs identified by the new architect, the latest 
reports of client under-utilization, the lack of strong involvement in the project by the Board of 
Directors, and perhaps also the scrutiny of this investigation, 218 in July 1989, DSAS decided to 
discontinue its support for YATC.219 Having spent $973,525 on the project with no results, and 
anticipating additional expenditures in excess of $687, 123 before YATC would be operational, 
DSAS determined that it would not provide a fourth year of funding.220 
215 Armstrong Tr. at 556-57; Letter to Rafael Cantellops from Carleton Deming, dated January 14, 1988. When the 
decision was not reversed, Armstrong made cettain that the monies were included in the agency's allocation plan for the 
following year. Armstrong Tr. at 555-57, 559. 
216 Letter to Jose Rendon from Jose Nicot, dated February 17, 1988; Memorandum to Jose Rendon from Bill Griffin, dated 
June 20, 1988; Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Jose R. Rendon, dated September 22, 1988. 
217 See, ~. Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Jose R. Rendon, dated September Z2, 1988; Letter to Rafael 
Cantellops from John Grover, dated December 6, 1988. 
218 Martinez testified in June 1989 that he would take another look at YA TC in light of issues raised by the Commission's 
investigation. Martinez Tr. at 540-41. 
219 See Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Jose Rendon, dated June 29, 1989; Memorandum to Gerry Armstrong 
from Julio A. Martinez, dated June 23, 1989; Memorandum to Julio Martinez from Gerry Armstrong, dated June 22, 1989; 
Memorandum to Gerry Armstrong from Carl Deming, dated June 20, 1989; Memorandum to Carl Deming from Jose Rendon, 
dated May 16, 1989. 
220 Letter to Rafael Cantellops from Gerard Armstrong, dated July 14, 1989; Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Jose 
Rendon, dated June 29, 1989. 
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ill. PROSPECT, INC. 
·-
A. Introduction And Summary 
During the periods July 1985 to September 1985 and January 1986 to March 1987, 
DSAS budgeted $174,253 for Arnold Freeman, the Executive Director of Prospect, Inc., 
("Prospect") to establish a residential substance abuse program.221 For the initial three,month 
period, Prospect was allocated $45,000 to cover Freeman's expenses while he sought to acquire a 
site, obtain DSAS licensing and begin operations.222 The site of the program was to be Prospect 
Hospital ("Hospital"), located in the South Bronx, where Freeman had been the administrator 
until the Hospital closed and went into bankruptcy in March 1985.223 . However, because Freeman 
was unable to acquire the Hospital, the program was never established there. 
For the second 14,month funding period, DSAS provided Freeman $129 ,25 3 to 
find an alternate site and begin operations. 224 Although a site was located in Brooklyn, the 
program was never established. Rather, DSAS terminated funding as of March 1987, because of 
Prospect's "lack of demonstrable progress, poor documentation, and lack of response to calls and 
communications. "225 
An internal DSAS audit conducted between November 1987 and January 1988, 
and issued in March 1989, uncovered overwhelming evidence of both financial and bookkeeping 
irregularities, as well as questionable payments for leases and services to individuals associated with 
Freeman.226 In addition, the Commission's investigation revealed that Prospect's subcontracts 
were plagued with conflicts of interest and higher costs resulting from those conflicts. Such 
problems, however, were either undetected or ignored by DSAS. 
221 Contract No. C001502 between DSAS and Prospect, Inc., effective July 1, 1985 to September 30, 1985; Contract No. 
C001560, and amendments thereto, between DSAS and Prospect, Inc., effective January 1, 1986 to March 31, 1987. 
222 Contract No. C001502 between DSAS and Prospect, Inc., effective July 1, 1985 to September 30, 1985. 
223 Freeman Tr. at 13, 29-30. 
224 Contract No. COO 1560, and amendments thereto, between DSAS and Prospect, Inc., effective January 1, 1986 to March 
31 , 1987. 
225 Letter to Joseph A. Spinelli, Inspector General, from Julio A. Martinez, dated August 25, 1988, p. 3. 
226 DSAS Bureau of Field Audit and Program Review Audit Repon on Prospect, Inc., filed March 29, 1989. In particular, 
of $83,000 in total audit disallowances, $37,000 was disallowed as salary payments made by Prospect to Freeman during periods 
when Prospect had no contract with DSAS. !Q. A consultant's fee of $2,000 was also disallowed, because it was paid to one 
of Prospect's own stockholders. !Q. Finally, DSAS disallowed $29,085 in payments for office space leased to Prospect, which 
proved to be an upper East Side one-bedroom cooperative apartment. !Q. 
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Benito Fernandez, a close friend of DSAS Director Martinez and Deputy Director 
LaPorte, was the person who first approached DSAS about funding for Prospect and was 
Freeman's primary financial sponsor and strategist. Fernandez (1) had the primary leasehold 
interest in the cCXJperative apartment that Prospect rented as an office, (2) owned the BrCXJklyn 
site located for Prospect's program, and (3) is related to the owner of the construction company 
that submitted the low bid for renovation work that was to have been done at the BrCXJklyn site. 
In each instance, Fernandez set up and arranged the subcontracts, each time benefiting either him-
self or a relative. 
B. The Relationships Between Director Martinez, Deputy 
Director LaPorte, Benito Fernandez And Arnold Freeman 
Fernandez, a wealthy and influential businessman, has known Martinez about nine 
or ten years, and they and their wives socialize together in New York City, Albany and Puerto 
Rico.227 LaPorte who has known Fernandez for many years228 has an even closer relationship with 
Fernandez than does Martinez. 229 
Fernandez's relationship with Freeman, on the other hand, was purely financial. 
Fernandez committed $450,000 to Prospect and arranged for a financial services agency to lend 
the project another $240,000; Freeman obtained the latter loan without ever making an applica-
tion or talking to a representative of the agency.230 According to Freeman, if the project had gone 
forward, Fernandez would have received a "finder's fee" for his assistance.231 
227 Fernandez Tr. at 16-18; Martinez Tr. at 354-58, 367. Martinez described various incidents indicative of a close 
relationship, such as his visiting Fernandez in the hospital, and his daughter staying with the Fernandez family at their Long 
Island home. Martinez at 354, 357. 
228 LaPorte Tr. at 86-88. 
229 Martinez Tr. at 366-67. Armstrong has seen photographs of LaPorte at parties at Fernandez's home in Puerto Rico. 
Armstrong Tr. at 1083-84. 
230 Freeman Tr. at 37-38; Undated Letter to Nicholas J. Mongiardo from B. R. Fernandez. Fernandez testified that the 
$450,000 was not his own money and would not actually have been loaned to Freeman. Fernandez Tr. at 30-35. The 
comminnent letter was written to satisfy Health Deparanent concerns about the fiscal viability of Freeman's proposal. IQ. The 
amount of the comminnent represented the mortgage value of certain brownstones that Freeman would have purchased as a 
part of his acquisition of the Hospital, but which the Health Deparanent had refused to recognize in assessing the proposal. 
!Q. 
231 Freeman Tr. at 38. 
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c. Prospect's Initial Contact With DSAS 
And The Involvement Of Charles LaPorte 
The idea of using DSAS funding to turn the bankrupt Hospital into a drug 
treatment center was first broached to Martinez by Fernandez sometime in the first half of 1985.232 
Martinez recalls that Fernandez was the principal person interested in buying the facility,233 and 
that he told Fernandez to complete a DSAS funding application and follow the agency's normal 
procedures. 234 
However, Prospect did not follow the normal procedures, which would have 
entailed a review of the program's funding proposarby Contract Management staff. Rather, 
Freeman approached and worked with LaPorte.235 Armstrong did not learn of the project until he 
was called into a meeting with Martinez and LaPorte in the Summer of 1985.236 They told 
Armstrong that DSAS would fund Prospect as part of a multi-agency effort, spearheaded by the 
Governor's office, to save the Hospital.237 Thus, contrary to DSAS guidelines, Contract 
Management had no input into the decision.238 
LaPorte continued his active involvement thereafter. For example, at LaPorte's 
suggestion, Freeman sent him Prospect's first proposed budget, and the two of them discussed ways 
that it should be modified before it was sent on to Contract Management.239 Armstrong testified 
about LaPorte's persistent involvement: 
232 Martinez Tr. at 347-53. 
233 !Q. 
234 !Q. at 365-66. 
235 Freeman Tr. at 63. Freeman's first correspondence with DSAS, as well as his original funding proposal, were sent to 
and discussed with LaPorte. See Letter to Charles LaPorte from Arnold Freeman, dated April 22, 1985; Letter to Charles 
LaPorte from Arnold Freeman, dated May 29, 1985. 
236 Armstrong Tr. at 1007. 
237 !Q. at 1007, 1418-19. In his testimony, Martinez denied that funding the project was a priority of the Governor. 
Martinez Tr. at 358-60. The Governor's office was more interested in a church-related organization's acquiring the site and 
using it to help homeless persons. !Q. 
238 Armstrong Tr. at 1013, 1016. 
239 Freeman Tr. at 312-13. The first budget authorized a $26,000/year salary for Thomas Puzo, one of Freeman's parmers, 
to be employed as an "Assistant Site Selector." See Contract No. C001502 between DSAS and Prospect, Inc., effective July 
l, 1985 to September 30, 1985. Since in DSAS parlance "site" refers to the location of the program and at the time of the 
contract the Hospital had already been identified as the site, the need for a "site selector" or an "assistant" is not apparent. 
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There was always pres.sure put on myself and my staff (by LaPorte] 
to hurry things along in terms of proces.sing, to continue funding, to 
help them in terms of technical as.sistance, find additional sites, to 
generally keep the project moving forward and fully funded. 240 
* * * 
In this particular case, the pres.sure ... was constant, was overt and 
was relentles.s.241 
Even after funding had terminated and DSAS auditors had found numerous 
irregularities, LaPorte continued to urge additional funding for the project. 242 Indeed, Armstrong 
overheard LaPorte helping Freeman draft responses to DSAS' audit report.243 
LaPorte's involvement with Prospect was inappropriate, because he has no official 
responsibilities in that area. As head of Chemotherapy Services, LaPorte would have had an 
interest in Prospect's initial proposal, which sought to establish a detoxification unit at the 
Hospital.244 However, he should not have had any role with respect to the program's budget, since 
that was Contract Management's responsibility.245 Moreover, after the Hospital became 
unavailable, the project changed to a drug-free treatment program, and LaPorte had no reason to 
continue his involvement. 246 Any as.sistance to Freeman in responding to the agency's audit 
should have come from the Bureau of Field Audit and Program Review, not LaPorte.247 
240 Armstrong Tr. at 1021. 
241 !Q.. at 1175. See also if!. at 1427-32, 1434-35. 
242 Id. at 1144, 1164. 
243 !Q.. at 1130-31, 1432-33. Freeman denied receiving any such as.sistance, Freeman Tr. at 247-48, and LaPone testified 
that he told Freeman only that he had a right to respond. LaPone Tr. at 145. 
244 Griffin Tr. at 294; Armstrong Tr. at 1009. 
245 Griffin Tr. at 421-22. LaPone denies any involvement in the funding process. He claims that he only wrote a letter 
attesting to the need for detoxification services in the South Bronx and that he did not even know that Prospect had applied 
for DSAS funding until after the contract had been signed. LaPone Tr. at 86, 91 -92, 97. 
246 Griffin Tr. at 421-22. 
247 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 418. 
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D. Attempts To Secure Prospect Hospital And •-
The Rental Of An "Office" On East 80th Street 
Freeman testified that throughout the Fall of 1985 and into the Spring of 1986 he 
was working with lawyers to acquire the Hospital through bankruptcy proceedings.248 Prospect 
sought and received DSAS funding for the rental of an office in Manhattan to satisfy Freeman's 
purported need to attend frequent meetings and bankruptcy court proceedings.249 
However, the rental of the "office" was not an arms,length transaction. The "office" 
was a one,bedroom cooperative apartment on East 80th Street which Fernandez had leased for 
more than ten years under ~he name "Re~l Estate AssOciates" for about $600/month. 25° Fernandez 
testified that at times he has used the apartment as a residence but that, when he sub,leased it to 
Prospect, he was using it as an office.251 
The 50,called office was located for Prospect by Fernandez,252 and the lease, which 
ran from June 1, 1985 through June 30, 1988, was signed by Fernandez, as lessor, on behalf of Real 
Estate Associates.253 Although dated July 1, 1985, the lease was prepared by Fernandez in 1987 
after funding had ceased and DSAS had notified Freeman that it would audit Prospect's con, 
tract.254 The lease called for monthly rent payments of $1,360, and later $1,667, but, according to 
Freeman, Fernandez did not always require payment since he understood that Prospect could only 
pay rent when it had the money.255 
Moreover, Freeman rarely used the "office." By his own account, he used it only 
two to four times a month but since he had no keys to the apartment, Fernandez always met him 
248 Freeman Tr. at 32-34. 
249 Letter to Nick Colamaria from Arnold Freeman, dated April 12, 1988. 
250 Fernandez Tr. at 5-6, 11-12. 
25 I !Q. at 5-6. 
252 Freeman Tr. at 97. 
253 Lease Between Real Estate As.sociates, Landlord, and New Prospect, Inc., Tenant, dated July 1, 1985. 
254 Freeman Tr. at 292-95. Bill Griffin, the contract manager for Prospect, testified that he never saw the lease prior to 
his deposition in this investigation. Griffin Tr. at 459-60. 
255 Lease Between Real Estate As.sociates, Landlord, and New Prospect, Inc., Tenant, dated July 1, 1985. Freeman Tr. 
at 265-67. 
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there to let him in.256 Freeman may not even have used the apartment as often as he claims. With 
at-most four exceptions throughout Freeman's "tenancy," he never had exclusive use of the apart-
ment.257 DSAS always telephoned Freeman at his home in Westchester County, and all but two 
DSAS letters were addressed to his home.258 Indeed, Freeman incorrectly described the apartment 
as being on the building's first floor, when it actually is on the fifth floor.259 
Finally, even though by June 1986, Freeman's alleged need to attend frequent 
bankruptcy proceedings had ended and Prospect had found a new site in Brooklyn, he kept the 
"office" and drew DSAS funds for it until November 1987.260 He terminated the lease after DSAS 
notified him that it would be auditing Prospect, and told the auditors that the "office" would not be 
available for their inspection since he no longer rented it.261 
DSAS never learned the full extent of Fernandez's interest in the apartment.262 
Martinez, however, knew that the "office" was one of Fernandez's residences, since the two had 
dined there together.263 Martinez testified that when he saw the DSAS audit raising questions 
about the "office" and the identity of its owner, he "chose not to" tell the auditors about Fernan-
dez's interest in the apartment.264 
256 Freeman Tr. at 286-88. 
257 !Q. 
258 DSAS Bureau of Field Audit and Program Review Audit Report on Prospect, Inc., filed March 29, 1989, p. 9. One 
of the two letters sent to East 80th Street was returned to DSAS marked "addressee unknown.• Id. 
259 Freeman Tr. at 99. 
260 !Q. at 118, 260. 
261 !Q. at 268-69; DSAS Bureau of Field Audit and Program Review Audit Report on Prospect, Inc., filed March 29, 1989. 
Freeman testified that he gave up the "office• to move to the new facility in Brooklyn. Freeman Tr. at 261. 
262 When questioned by DSAS auditors, Freeman denied knowing the identity of the landlord. Freeman Tr. at 257-59. 
Later, Freeman discussed the auditors' questions with Fernandez, who told Freeman that the apamnent was owned by Sheldon 
Gold, and Freeman so informed DSAS. !Q. DSAS auditors did learn that Freeman sent rent for the apamnent to a Brooklyn 
post office box that Fernandez had rented. See DSAS Bureau of Field Audit and Program Review Audit Report on Prospect, 
Inc., filed March 29, 1989. 
263 Martinez Tr. at 357, 394. 
264 !Q. at 393, 395. When asked why he didn't tell the auditors, Martinez stated that he "[p]robably didn't think of it." 
!Q. at 395. 
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E. The Loss Of Prospect Hospital And The Move To Brooklyn 
·-
By the middle of 1986, it became clear that Prospect would not secure the Hospital 
through the bankruptcy proceeding.265 Nevertheless, DSAS remained committed to funding Pros-
pect. According to Armstrong, DSAS' (particularly LaPorte's) desire to do business with Prospect 
was unshakable.266 
Almost as soon as the Hospital purchase fell through, Freeman located a new site 
on Van Siclen Avenue in Brooklyn.267 As with the East 80th Street apartment, however, the Van 
Siclen site was not discovered by chance: Fernandez suggested the site, and offered to buy it and 
then lease it to Freeman.268 By mid-June-1986, Freeman had submitted to DSAS a proposed lease 
for the site. 269 -
However, Fernandez's involvement with the Van Siclen site was never made clear 
to DSAS.270 Upon learning that the proposed lease listed Fernandez as an officer of the building's 
corporate owner, Armstrong asked Griffin, Deming and LaPorte to determine the full extent of 
Fernandez's involvement.271 Armstrong cannot remember what Griffin and Deming learned, but 
LaPorte told him that Fernandez was not involved.272 
Subsequently, Freeman gave DSAS a revised lease for the Van Siclen site which 
showed a new landlord.273 On the surface, since the landlord had changed, it looked as if 
265 Memorandum to Joe Robert from William Griffin, dated June 17, 1986; Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from 
Charles LaPorte, dated June 30, 1986. 
266 Armstrong Tr. at 1063. Martinez's interest and participation in the project faded over time, particularly by the Fall of 
1985, when the involvement of other agencies looked doubtful. M· at 1058, 1102-03. 
267 Freeman Tr. at 144-47. 
268 M· at 147-55. 
269 Memorandum to Deborah Damm from William J. Griffin, dated June 17, 1986, and attached Lease between Horizons 
Investors Corp. and Prospect, Inc. 
270 Ultimately, DSAS auditors learned that the landlord at Van Siclen used the same post office box that Fernandez had 
rented in connection with the East 80th Street "office." See DSAS Bureau of Field Audit and Program Review Audit Report 
on Prospect, Inc., filed March 29, 1989. 
271 Armstrong Tr. at 1100-01. 
272 Id. at 1101. Griffin does not remember ever discussing Fernandez's involvement in the Yan Siclen site: he claims not 
to have hiown about this connection until, at the earliest, DSAS' audit. Griffin Tr. at 347, 351-53. 
273 Freeman Tr. at 163-65. Lease Between 578 Yan Siclen Ave. Corp., Landlord, and New Prospect Corporation, Tenant, 
dated October 1, 1986. 
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Fernandez was no longer involved.274 In fact, the new lease was signed by one of Fernandez's 
associates and Fernandez continued to have an ownership interest in the property. 275 
Fernandez also had a hidden interest in the extensive renovation work that the 
Van Siclen site required. Although DSAS rules required Prospect to solicit three bids for the 
work, Freeman obtained only two bids and showed them to Fernandez, who then recommended a 
third (and ultimately the lowest) bidder, Confiansa Builders Corp.276 Confiansa is owned by 
Fernandez's cousin277 and in its bid documents used the address and a telephone number of a 
Brooklyn psychiatric facility owned by Fernandez.278 
F. Freeman's Other Paid Activities During The Contract Term 
Although Freeman drew a full,time annual salary of$65,000 while working to 
establish Prospect, he also engaged in other paid business activities during the term of his con, 
tracts.279 During the last half of 1986, he earned $17,000 as a consultant to Physician's Hospital in 
Queens,280 and "on and off through '87'' he was actively working with Fernandez in his ultimately 
unsuccessful effort to acquire a midtown Manhattan nursing home. 281 
274 Lease Between 578 Van Skien Ave. Corp., Landlord, and New Prospect Corporation, Tenant, dated October 1, 1986. 
275 Fernandez testified that the switch in landlords was done to shield the owner, a real estate holding company, from 
liability on the property. Fernandez Tr. at 73. 
276 Freeman Tr. at 174, 176, 319. Freeman maintains that he showed the two bids to Fernandez because their costs were 
significantly different and he wanted an opinion as to the disparity in amounts. !Q.. at 319. 
277 Fernandez Tr. at 78-81. 
278 !Q.. at 80; Statement of Construction Expense Dated March 31, 1987, Submitted By Confiansa Builders Corp., 2830 
Pitkin Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, to Mr. Arnold Freeman, 222 East 80th Street, Suite 5A, New York, New York. When 
the telephone number is called, a person answers by stating the name of the psychiatric facility. Confiansa is not listed in any 
1986-1987 New York City or Long Island telephone directory. 
279 These other activities were not discovered during DSAS' audit. 
280 Freeman Tr. at 8. 
281 !Q.. at 207-10. 
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G. Contract Management's Dissatisfaction With ·· 
Freeman And The Termination Of Prospect's Funding 
By the Fall of 1986, Contract Management staff had grown disillusioned with 
Freeman and Prospect.282 Freeman mis.5ed deadlines and often ignored Contract Management's 
requests, as if Freeman had been assured that LaPorte would take care of everything.283 Indeed, 
Freeman testified that he always viewed LaPorte as the one in charge. 284 
By late 1986, Armstrong became concerned about Prospect's expenditures and did 
not want to extend its contr3:ct. Although such a decision would nol"!Ilally be his to make, perhaps 
in consultation with Martinez and/or Debye,Saxinger, in this instance he felt that his hands were 
tied since LaPorte wanted to continue funding Prospect.285 
Eventually, Armstrong approached Martinez about closing the program.286 
However, because Martinez relied on LaPorte's continual reassurances that Freeman would 
"deliver" a program, Martinez did not support Armstrong.287 Moreover, because of LaPorte's 
adamant commitment to Prospect, Armstrong did not press his own staff's position as strongly as 
he would have on a program that lacked such an influential advocate.288 As a result, LaPorte's 
interests prevailed and a new contract was signed continuing funding through March 198 7. 289 
This contract would, however, prove to be Prospect's last. 
282 Armstrong Tr. at 1121-22. 
283 !Q. at 1130. 
284 Freeman at 221. LaPorte, however, denies any significant involvement, saying that he occasionally got a call from 
Freeman asking about the status of his contracts or payments, and that he would then casually inquire of Griffin. LaPorte Tr. 
at 94-95. 
285 Armstrong Tr. at 1128, 1143-44, 1159-64. 
286 !Q. at 1162. 
287 !Q. at 1163, 1462. 
288 !Q. at 14 75-76. 
289 !Q. at 1163. 
58 
In the Fall of 1987, at Armstrong's request, DSAS audited Prospect.290 In addition 
to disclosing the questionable office rental, the payment of Freeman's salary in unfunded periods, 
and the consultant payment to a Prospect shareholder, the audit's initial findings, released in 
December, revealed that Prospect's financial records were in total disarray. Neither time and 
attendance, nor daily activity reports had been maintained, and payroll taxes had not been 
withheld.291 Presented with the overwhelming evidence that no progress was being made, 
Martinez was convinced, over LaPorte's continuing objection, to terminate Prospect's contract.292 
IV. NATIONAL EXPERT CARE CONSULTANTS 
A. Introduction And Summary 
Don Russakoff founded National Expert Care Consultants, Inc. (''NECC") in 1985 
as a for,profit business with Russakoff its sole owner and shareholder.293 He is also the owner of 
National Management Analysts, Inc. ("NMA"), which provided consulting services to NECC and 
other DSAS,funded substance abuse programs, and A.K. Holdings, Inc. ("AKH"), a real estate 
holding company that leased space to NECC for its operations. 294 
DSAS entered into a series of contracts with NECC between July 1986 and March 
1988. During that time, NECC received funds for the start,up and operation of a drug,free 
residential treatment program with a capacity of 40 clients at 455 West 50th Street; residential and 
outpatient programs with capacities of 36 and 70 clients, respectively, at 458 West 50th Street; 
290 IQ. at 1134-35. At approximately the same time, the State Comptroller was auditing DSAS and showed some interest 
in Prospect. See Letter to Norwig Debye-Saxinger from Christine A. Storonslcy, dated January 11, 1988, and accompanying 
Preliminary Draft Audit Findings of the Office of State Comptroller, p. 12. 
291 DSAS Bureau of Field Audit and Program Review Audit Report on Prospect, Inc., dated March 29, 1989. See also 
Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from William Griffin, dated December 4, 1987; Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from 
William Griffin, dated December 7, 1987. 
The DSAS auditors did not discover Fernandez's relationship with Confiansa Builders Corp., or that the lowest bid 
did not come in until after the first two had been reviewed by Fernandez. They also did not realize Fernandez's interests in 
the Van Siclen site and the East 80th Street "office." Although the auditors were suspicious about Freeman's use of the "office," 
they did not uncover how seldom he used it or that the lease was prepared after the fact. The auditors also did not uncover 
Freeman's other paid activities while he was receiving DSAS funding. 
292 Armstrong Tr. at 1164. 
293 Russakoff Tr. at 3-5 . NECC now operates under the name "National Recovery Institutes." IQ. at 17. 
294 IQ. at 3-4. 
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and, briefly, administrative offices at 309 West 9lst Street in Manhattan.295 In all, NECC received 
contracts totaling more than $4.2 million.296 · -
NECC was a unique DSAS contractor in three respects. First, with one small 
exception, NECC was the first and only for,profit treatment provider with which DSAS 
contracted. 297 Second, NECC proposed to operate an intensive rehabilitation program which, 
instead of the usual long,term program (18 months on average), would release clients in three to 
four months. 298 Third, DSAS funded NECC with the understanding that Russakoff intended to 
phase out treating indigent clients within two to five years and instead treat fee,paying clients 
without DSAS financial support.299 Thus, DSAS funds helped Russakoff start a private profit, 
making enterprise. 300 
B. The Relationship Between Don 
Russakoff And Director Martinez 
Both Martinez and Russakoff deny that they are personal friends. 301 However, they 
admit that they have a social relationship, 302 and the two are perceived as friends by others at 
DSAS. 303 Martinez attributes the perception to their long professional relationship and Russakoff s 
habit of "dropping" Martinez's name in conversations with others.304 
295 Contract No. C001673 between DSAS and National Expert Care Consultants, Inc., effective July I, 1986 to August 
31, 1987; Contract No. COOl831 between DSAS, National Expert Care Consultants, Inc., and A. K. Holdings, Inc., effective 
February I, 1987 to August 31, 1987; Contract No. C002118 between DSAS and National Expert Care Consultants, Inc., 
effective May 1, 1987 to August 31, 1987; and Contract No. C001939 between DSAS and National Expert Care Consultants, 
Inc., effective September l, 1987 to March 31, 1988. 
296 !.Q. 
297 Deming Tr. at 378. 
298 !.Q. at 385; Armstrong Tr. at 678-79. 
299 Armstrong Tr. at 725; Deming Tr. at 398-99, 427-29. 
300 Deming Tr. at 399. 
301 Martinez Tr. at 80; Russakoff Tr. at 167. 
302 They have visited each other's home on several occasions, and Russakoff has spent the night at Martinez's home in 
Albany and has joined Martinez's private card games. Martinez Tr. at 87-89; RussakoffTr. at 170-71. 
303 Armstrong Tr. at 362, 659, 821-22, 1349, 1401-02. 
304 Martinez acknowledged that DSAS employees believe that he and Russakoff are "very close friends and ... very, very 
tight." Martinez Tr. at 97. Russakoff contributes to that impression by telling others, "Julio and I discussed this," when discussing 
a matter that interests Russakoff. !.Q. at 99. 
(continued ... ) 
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Martinez and Russakoff have known each other since the late 1960's, when both 
worked for the Addiction Services Agency and then operated treatment programs in New York 
City. 305 In the 1970's, they were both active in organizing the "City of the Forgotten" in Albany ,, 
a protest against the Legislature's cutbacks in funding for drug treatment.306 Russakoff, both as an 
official of a treatment program and later as a registered lobbyist, also lobbied for bills that would 
increase DSAS funding for his clients.307 Martinez and Russakoff often consulted during the 
legislative session and had long telephone conversations on programmatic issues of mutual 
concern. 308 
C. The Decision To Fund NECC 
Although Armstrong and other high-level DSAS staff had reservations about 
funding NECC, "Martinez felt Don had the credentials to run a decent program, he felt he could 
trust Don, and Don would deliver, and he'd rather do business with someone that he knew, and 
knew had clinical experience and academic credentials, than somebody he did not know. "309 
Martinez therefore rejected or ignored concerns expressed by Armstrong and failed to consult 
Debye-Saxinger. He thus committed DSAS to supporting NECC and circumvented the agency's 
evaluation process. 
1. The Meeting Between Director 
Martinez, Don Russakoff And Ed Menken 
NECC's first funding application proposed to establish a residential program at 455 
West 50th Street, where Veritas (another treatment provider and client ofNMA) had operated a 
3o4 ( ... continued) 
Other DSAS-funded service providers also view Martinez and Russakoff as having a close relationship, since they sometimes 
called Martinez to complain about NMA's failure to perform services under consultant contracts. Armstrong Tr. at 663-64, 822; 
Martinez Tr. at 118-19. Debye-Saxinger and Martinez believe that NMA succeeded in obtaining consultant contracts because 
service providers perceived him as being close to Martinez. Debye-Saxinger Tr. at -48-51 ; Martinez Tr. at 125. 
305 Deming Tr. at 223; Armstrong Tr. at 362, 818-19. 
306 Armstrong Tr. at 657-58, 819, 1353-54. 
307 IQ. at 655-57, 1351-53; Deming Tr. at 212, 220. 
308 Armstrong Tr. at 1351-53; Debye-Saxinger Tr. 148. On at least one occasion, Martinez also sought Russakoffs advice 
on a personal matter. Martinez needed an accountant and Russakoff recommended his own in a conversation that Martinez 
says occurred before he became Director of DSAS. Russakoff Tr. at 174; Martinez Tr. at 93-95. 
309 Armstrong Tr. at 1387. See also Deming Tr. at 219. 
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program.310 The proposal was submitted to DSAS in early Febru;ry 1986 at a meeting in 
Martinez's New York City office.311 Attending the meeting were Martinez, Russakoff, and Ed 
Menken, who was NECC's Executive Director and a long-time aswciate of Martinez.312 
Immediately after the meeting, Martinez gave the proposal to Armstrong.313 Sometime later, 
Armstrong received another copy of the proposal in the mail with a cover letter dated February 3, 
1986.314 
Martinez does not recall the initial meeting with Menken and Russakoff, but 
remembers Russakoff mentioning that he had a treatment site.315 He testified that he told 
Russakoff to submit a proposal and "go through the normal process."316 However, the normal 
process was not followed, in part because Martinez in fact had met with Russakoff and Menken. 
Armstrong explained that "[t]he fact of the matter is, if [a funding proposal] has already been 
discussed at Julio's level, then there is what is perceived as a commitment and it can't be handled 
as objectively as other programs."317 
Indeed, subsequent conversations with Martinez convinced Armstrong that 
Martinez had already decided to fund NECC and that any concerns or objections by DSAS staff 
would not alter the outcome. 
310 Russakoff Tr. at 114; Deming Tr. at 207, 227. 
311 Armstrong Tr. at 635-37, 1361. 
312 !Q. at 363, 635-37, 1361. Menken is a former addict who used to be Martinez's boss at the New York City Addiction 
Services Agency in the late l 960's. Sometime later, when Martinez was director of Project Return, Menken began using drugs 
again and called him for help. Martinez got him into the Odyssey House treatment program and then hired him to work at 
Project Return . Martinez Tr. at 134-35. 
313 Armstrong Tr. at 635-37. 
314 !Q. at 680. 
315 Martinez Tr. at 112-15. 
316 Id. at 199. Russakoff also has no recollection of meeting with Martinez and Menken; he testified that his proposal was 
initially ifucussed only by Menken and Armstrong. Russakoff Tr. at 163, 165. 
317 Armstrong Tr. at 840-41. Armstrong testified that he raised this problem to Martinez in the context of the NECC pro-
posal, jQ. at 839-41, but Martinez recalls no such conversation. Martinez Tr. at 131. 
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2. Armstrong's Objection To Ed Menken As NECC's Executive Director 
In particular, Armstrong was concerned about funding a program that had Ed 
Menken as its Executive Director. Menken had briefly served as director of Project Return after 
Martinez had left that program to head DSAS.318 According to Armstrong, during Menken's 
short tenure at Project Return Menken, he led the program to the brink ofbankruptcy.319 
AB soon as Armstrong saw that Russakoff s proposal included Menken as NECC's 
director, he strongly argued to Martinez that DSAS should not fund NECC. 320 Martinez reacted 
by harshly castigating Armstrong. 321 Soon afterward, LaPorte warned Armstrong that Martinez 
was extremely upset about his objection to Menken; LaPorte gave Armstrong the clear impression 
that his job was at risk if he did not become more supportive of DSAS funding for NECC. 322 
Based on Martinez's angry reaction and LaPorte's pressure, Armstrong concluded 
that Martinez had effectively decided to fund NECC. 323 Armstrong realized that Martinez had a 
strong personal commitment to the program and viewed Armstrong as "attacking his friends."324 
Armstrong therefore concluded that there would be no way "to manage NECC in a neutral way" 
and gradually withdrew from active involvement in the project: "I withdrew deliberately ... with 
the sense that,, I didn't want this from the beginning."325 
318 Deming Tr. at 237; Armstrong Tr. at 645. 
319 Armstrong Tr. at 363, 645. See also Deming Tr. at 237-38. 
320 Armstrong Tr. at 363, 365, 688, 840, 1362. 
321 !Q. at 363-64, 647-48, 839-40, 1362. Armstrong concluded that Martinez must have had a vested interest in Menken 
being NECC's Director and that Martinez may have urged Russakoff to hire Menken. !Q. at 654-55, 684-85, 1362-63, 1384. 
His conclusion was bolstered in the Spring of 1986, when Menken "disappeared" without notice or forwarding address. Russakoff 
Tr. at 161; Deming Tr. at 268-69. Then, Russakoff expressed relief and stated that he had not wanted to hire Menken anyway. 
Armstrong Tr. at 364, 647, 685. · 
322
.Annstrong Tr. at 647-48, 841-44. Martinez denies that Armstrong raised any objections to Menken, that he had any 
conversation about Menken with Armstrong, or that he discussed the issue with LaPone. Martinez Tr. at 146-48, 150. LaPone 
does not recall having had any conversation with Armstrong about the latter's exchange with Martinez, or even knowing that 
the two had disagreed about Menken. LaPone Tr. at 74-75. 
323 Armstrong Tr. at 841-44, 1362. 
324 !Q. at 847-49. 
325 !Q. at 847-50. 
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3. Concerns About NECC's Contract With The Division Of Parole 
·-
Although Armstrong felt more comfortable about funding NECC once Menken 
left the program in the Spring of 1986, 326 by then he also had concerns because of information he 
had received from the New York State Division of Parole ("Parole").327 NECC had previously 
contracted with Parole in late 1985 for the operation of a "Parole Resource Center" at 455 West 
50th Street, to provide counseling and other services for recent parolees.328 Parole cancelled the 
contract in February 1986, even before the program had begun, when Parole officials concluded 
that NECC had deceived them. 329 
Ac-cording to Ramon Rodriguez, Parole's Chairman, NECC had sub-leased the 
program site fr9m AKH without disclosing that AKH was also owned by Russakoff. 330 ~Rodriguez 
testified that during negotiations Russakoff pressured Parole to consummate the contract by 
asserting that NECC was under pressure from AKH to sign a lease.331 In late January 1986, Parole 
discovered that Russakoff owned AKH and that the sub-lease between AKH and NECC called for 
more rent than AKH had to pay the building's owner under the prime lease.332 Thus, Russakoff 
was secretly earning a profit on the lease arrangement, at Parole's expense. 
On February 3, 1986, Rodriguez decided to cancel the NECC contract and his staff 
so advised Russakoff.333 Angry about NECC's deception, Rodriguez also immediately called 
Martinez and told him the details surrounding Parole's decision.334 
326 IQ. at 848, 1383. See above, fn . 321. 
327 Armstrong Tr. at 649-50. 
328 Agreement dated December 26, 1985, between N.Y.S. Executive Department, Division of Parole, and National Expen 
Care Consultants, Inc., effective January 15, 1986 to January 14, 1987. 
329 Letters to Don Rus.sakoff from Edward Elwin, dated February 5, 1986 and February 10, 1986. 
330 Rodriguez Tr. at 10-11. 
331 IQ. at 7-8, 10-11. 
332 IQ. 
333 IQ. at 12-13. 
334 Rodriguez Tr. at 11-15. Rodriguez testified that he called Maninez because he knew that Ru~akoff worked with DSAS· 
funded programs. IQ. Maninez testified that Rodriguez called him and said that the program was too expensive and that he 
had reservations about Ru~akoff. Maninez Tr. at 164. 
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Sometime after Armstrong received the NECC proposal that had been mailed to 
him on February 3, 1986, Armstrong learned (~ibly from Rus.5akoffhimsel0 that NECC had 
had a contract with Parole. 335 Armstrong told Martinez, who instructed him to contact Martin 
Kelly at Parole and find out about Parole's dealings with NECC.336 Martinez did not tell 
Armstrong what he had already learned from Rodriguez, or even that he had spoken to Rodri-
guez. 337 
Armstrong called Kelly who told him that Parole had terminated its contract with 
NECC because Parole did not like Rus.5akoffs method of doing business.338 Kelly explained that 
Parole also was concerned about NECC's status as a for-profit entity and Rus.5akoffs proposed 
profit level. 339 Kelly advised Armstrong that Parole had already paid NECC for certain expenses at 
455 West 50th Street, and that if DSAS contracted with NECC it should be wary not to pay for 
them again.340 Kelly recommended that DSAS not get involved with Russakoff.341 
Armstrong conveyed the substance of this conversation to Martinez, saying that 
Parole "feels pretty strongly against this and is recommending that we don't get involved in this."342 
Martinez responded that Parole did not have experience with local service providers and indicated 
that he would call Rodriguez. 343 Armstrong testified that Martinez later mentioned that he had 
spoken to Rodriguez and that Parole's concerns should not affect DSAS' doing business with 
Rus.5akoff. 344 
335 Armstrong Tr. at 649-51. 
336 Id. at 650. 
337 !Q. at 650-51 , 666, 693. 
338 Id. at 651-53, 666. 
339 !Q'. at 652, 666-67. 
340 Id. 
341 !Q. at 652, 666-72. 
342 !Q. at 652. 
343 !Q. at 665. 
344 Id. at 665, 669-70. Martinez does not recall any discussion with Armstrong or anyone else within DSAS about Parole's 
problems-with NECC, or that anyone at DSAS told him that Parole did not think DSAS should enter into a contract with 
Russakoff. Martinez Tr. at 168-72. 
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4. Other Concerns About Funding NECC 
·-
Armstrong, Debye-Saxinger and Deming had additional reservations about 
contracting with NECC based upon their own experiences with Russakoff. They all considered 
Russakoff an "operator,"345 and Armstrong remembered him as "very difficult to do business 
with"346 and as having failed to perform work he had promised to NMA clients. 347 
Although Armstrong believed that Russakoff had gcxxl credentials and the ability 
to run a decent program, 348 he felt that Russakoff was not committed to delivering treatment 
services. 349 De bye-Saxinger similarly felt that Russakoff was "too much after the money and too 
little after the services," and also believed that Russakoff sold himself by_ whom he knew rather 
than what he could do. 350 · • 
Debye-Saxinger also opposed funding NECC because DSAS had just gotten its 
financial affairs in order after having exceeded its budgets, and the agency could not afford a major 
new funding commitment.351 In his view, even if the agency had extra money, the money should 
have been given to existing programs to alleviate staff shortages and budget deficits or to expand 
treatment capabilities, rather than to an expensive profit-making business.352 Debye-Saxinger also 
noted that there were other new programs seeking funding but, unlike NECC, they went through 
the normal application process. 353 
345 Armstrong Tr. at 652-53; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 139-42; Deming Tr. at 208. 
346 Armstrong Tr. at 659-60. 
347 .!Q. at 653-54. See also Deming Tr. at 208-09. 
348 Armstrong Tr. at 645, 653. See also Deming Tr. at 230-31. 
349 Armstrong Tr. at 639. 
350 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 50-51, 126. Martinez acknowledged that Russakoff was perceived as "not committed or dedi-
cated" to the field, and recalls that Armstrong once advised him that Russakoff had over-committed himself and could not 
deliver on the work he had promised to NMA clients. Martinez Tr. at 118-20. Nevertheless, Martinez believed that Russakoff 
would deliver on NECC's treaonent program . .!Q. at 151. 
351 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 122-24. 
352 .!Q. at 125, 127. In 1986, DSAS did add 400 beds by asking existing programs to conven common space into residential 
space. Armstrong Tr. at 718. 
353 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 121-22. 
66 
However, Debye-Saxinger testified that Martinez did not solicit his views on 
funding NECC because Martinez knew that he would object to it. 354 According to Armstrong, 
when he advised De bye-Saxinger of his own objections to funding NECC and about his 
conversations with Martinez and LaPorte, he sensed that Debye-Saxinger, like himself, felt 
powerless to change the course of events: "I got the feeling ... that he, like I, felt it's a fact, and we 
are going to have to live with it. 11355 
5. Contract Management's Role In The Funding Decision 
Thus, apart from Armstrong's futile objections and concerns, Contract 
Management played no role in the decision to fund NECC. Although Deming testified that he 
had recommended that DSAS fund NECC,356 Armstrong made no mention of Deming's role in 
the decision and no documents reflect any such recommendation. To the contrary, two of 
Deming's memoranda at the time suggest that Deming believed that the decision had been or 
would be made by others.357 
Martinez testified that he asked Armstrong, LaPorte and Debye-Saxinger for their 
judgment on NECC's proposal and none of them opposed funding the program.358 He also said 
that the decision to contract with NECC was made by Armstrong, Chief Counsel Deborah Damm 
and Debye-Saxinger.359 
354 Id. at 139, 143, 144. 
355 Armstrong Tr. at 843. 
356 Deming Tr. at 235. 
357 Ip one, Deming obliquely stated, "[d]eterminations have been made within DSAS to proviife support to [NECC]." 
Memorandum to Martin Ringer from Carl Deming, dated February 26, 1986. ID another, Deming wrote: "I have requested 
Dennis Whalen [then an Executive Assistant to Manmez] to ascertain the direction we shall go in regarding the contractor and 
the site .... " Memorandum to John Cavallaro from Carl Deming, dated March 25, 1986. 
In response to the memoranda, Whalen wrote: "there appears to be some confusion regarding the role of Contract Manage-
ment in the licensing process, particularly regarding the [NECC] program." Memorandum to Carl Deming from Dennis P. 
Whalen, dated March 31, 1986. Whalen described Contract Management's role at length, insisted that "every program apply-
ing for licensure is subject to the identical process," and concluded: "Simply stated, we still need your office's preliminary funding 
determination and general recommendation before anything can be done with the licensing application." Id. 
358 Martinez Tr. at 146, 155. 
359 !Q. at 159-60. 
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D. NECC's Lease Arrangement At 455 West 50th Street 
As a part of its contracts with NECC, DSAS agreed to reimburse NECC for its rent 
at 455 West 50th Street beginning July l, 1986. As with the Parole contract, NECC sub,leased 
the site from AKH at a higher rent than AKH paid to the landlord. 360 Over a four and one,half 
year term, the total difference between the two leases was $167,700.361 
The rent surcharge is contrary to DSAS policy, which specifies that when a 
program leases space from a close affiliate, the rent should be the lesser of fair market value or net 
cost. 362 Although this violation was repeatedly noted by DSAS staff and officials for more than a 
year, the rent was not corrected until sometime in 1988 after it had been identified by the State 
Comptroller'in the course of an.at.Idit of DSAS' oversight of community,baSed programs. 363. 
In response to the State Comptroller's audit report, DSAS took the position that its 
policy regarding lease arrangements between affiliated companies pertains only to not,for,profit 
entities. 364 However, the written policy is not so limited and neither Armstrong nor De bye, 
Saxinger could justify such a distinction.365 Deming simply said, "we blew it .... We didn't do it 
properly. We didn't follow our own guidelines."366 
360 Memorandum to Dennis P. Whalen from Neil C. Grogin, dated January 12, 1987, p. 2. 
361 Id. 
362 !Q.; Deming Tr. at 247, 278. See DSAS Policy and Procedure Manual for Service Providers, Item 3100.6. 
363 Deming Tr. at 255, 282, 307..0S. At the beginning, Russakoff argued that the higher rent did reflect both the market 
value and the actual cost of the building. Letter to Gerard Armstrong from Don Russakoff, dated May 9, 1986. Although 
Contract Management was unsatisfied with Russakoff's explanations, Armstrong Tr. at 697-98, 702-03, nothing was done to 
change the lease arrangement at that time. 
The rent issue surfaced again In February 1987 when DSAS' Bureau of Field Audit and Program Review ("FAPR") issued 
a repon stating that the lease arrangement violates DSAS policy. See Memorandum to Julio Martinez, ~ ~!-, from Neil Grogin, 
dated February 2, 1987, and accompanying "Repon on the Examination of National Expert Care Consultants," by New York 
State Division of Substance Abuse Services, Bureau of Field Audit and Program Review. A month later, after NECC had 
provided essentially the same explanation that it had given the previous May, FAPR concluded that, of the $167, 700 that AKH 
would earn from the surcharge, only $5,145 qualified as legitimate expenses eligible for DSAS funding. Memorandum to Julio 
Martinez from Neil Grogin, dated March 2, 1987. Nevertheless, DSAS continued to pay the surcharge. 
364 Letter to Rohen H. Attrnore from Julio Martinez, dated November 16, 1988, p. 3. 
365 Armstrong Tr. at 776-80, 1379-80; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 180. 
366 Deming Tr. at 244. 
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E. NECC's "Indirect Cost Factor" 
In addition to the profit from the lease arrangement, DSAS agreed to include in 
each contract a guaranteed profit margin calculated at 17 .5%, and later l 7 .9%, of the program's 
personnel costs.367 Based upon NECC's approved budgets, DSAS authorized NECC to receive 
over $300,000 in profit in less than two years of operation. 
This profit is not disclosed anywhere on the face of the contracts or the approved 
budgets; instead, it is built into each budget's "salary," "fringe benefit," and "consultant" categories 
by increasing the dollar amounts therein by the amount of the profit factor. 368 The profit is 
revealed only in the "line-item back-up" documents that state in greater detail how the amounts in 
the general budget categories will be spent -- but there it is only identified as an "indirect cost 
factor," a term that is usually used to refer to non-itemized overhead costs.369 No documentation 
indicates how the term was selected. 31o 
Nor did DSAS document how the amount of profit was determined.371 Deming 
and Armstrong testified that Russakoff told them he needed that level of profit to get a bank 
loan.372 In response to the Comptroller's Preliminary Draft Audit Findings,373 DSAS stated that it 
understood during negotiations that the profit level was necessary for the program to obtain a 
mortgage.374 Yet, no written confirmation of any such requirement was found in DSAS' files and, 
367 Deming Tr. at 376; Ringer Tr. at 26-28. 
368 Deming Tr. at 519-21; Ringer Tr. at 52-53. Although also not indicated anywhere on the face of the contracts, or in 
any other document, consultant contracts with NMA were excluded when determining the guaranteed profit on personnel costs. 
Deming Tr. at 386-87. See below, pp. 70-71. 
369 Deming Tr. at 431; Ringer Tr. at 52-53. 
370 Deming testified that the term had been suggested by Russakoff. Deming Tr. at 430. 
371 In his February 2, 1987 memorandum~ above, fn . 363) Neil Grogin suggested that instead of an "arbitrary 17.5% 
of personal services costs, ... from the perspective of service provider incentive and the Division's desire to get quality services, 
it would seem that a profit factor linked to service provider performance (utilization) would be more effective and justifiable." 
No documentation indicates whether Grogin's suggestion was followed or even discussed. 
372 Deming Tr. at 377; Armstrong Tr. at 903-05. 
373 Lener to Norwig Debye-Saxinger from Christine A. Storonsky, dated January 11, 1988, and accompanying Preliminary 
Draft Audit Findings of the Office of State Comptroller. 
374 Lener to Robert H. Attmore from Julio Martinez, dated November 16, 1988, p. 3. 
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as the Comptroller's audit report points out, the program had no mortgage until Spring 1987, 
when AKH purchased the site at 458 West 50th Street.375 · -
The Comptroller's audit report likewise found no evidence that the profit level was 
ever evaluated by DSAS "to ensure it was reasonable when compared to similar proprietary 
operations funded by the State.11376 Debye-Saxinger and Armstrong testified that DSAS did 
examine the practices of other state agencies in 1987, but found no analogy to NECC.377 
F. NECC's Subcontract With NMA For Consulting Services 
DSAS permitted Russakoff to earn additional profit by allqwing NECC to hire 
Russakoff's consulting compati.y,-NMA, under subcontracts worth over $100,000.378 As-with all 
ofNECC's consultants, none of the NMA subcontracts was competitively bid, even though DSAS 
rules require it.379 Deming approved the NMA subcontracts without competitive bidding because, 
in his view, time was of the essence.380 
Under the subcontracts, NMA was to perform at least two functions. First, NMA 
provided consultants until NECC could hire permanent staff.381 Second, NMA helped prepare 
personnel manuals and other start-up documents.382 Armstrong testified that the first function 
was temporary and, in his view, appropriate, but the second function was one that should have 
been provided by NECC itself. 383 
375 Office of the State Comptroller Repon No. 88-S-57, "Division of Substance Abuse Services, Oversight of Community· 
Based Programs," p. 3. 
376 !Q.., p. 4. 
377 Debye-Saxinger testified that Contract Management was told to allow a profit within the guidelines of other agencies 
that contract with proprietary providers, and in Spring 1987 Henry Bartlett, head of DSAS' Third Party Reimbursement Unit, 
was asked to look into this matter. Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 194. In a memorandum to Deming dated December 24, 1987, 
Bartlett reponed that he found no situation analogous to NECC. He described DSAS' relationship with NECC as "akin to the 
relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur." 
378 Office of the State Comptroller Repon No. 88-S-57, "Division of Substance Abuse Services, Oversight of Community· 
Based Programs,• p. 5. However, the Comptroller's office has disallowed reimbursement for certain payments by NECC to NMA. 
Letter to Julio A. Martinez from Rohen H. Attmore, dated April 11, 1989. 
379 Deming Tr. at 375; DSAS Policy and Procedure Manual for Service Pr-0viders, Item 3100.22. 
380 Deming Tr. at 375, 382-83. 




NECC proposed in its licensing application that NMA provide "quality ~urance" 
by monitoring NECC's compliance with DSAS procedures and to detect programmatic problems. 
Although DSAS documents do not make clear whether DSAS actually paid for that service, the 
Comptroller's audit report indicates that DSAS did.384 The audit report also states, "from the 
deficiencies noted in the Division's comprehensive review, it does not appear that the consulting 
firm provided the services for which it was contracted. "385 
G. The Agreements Surrounding 458 West 50th Street 
In 1987, DSAS agreed to fund NECC's expansion of its program to an additional 
site at 458 West 50th Street. The contracts included $264,000 for "facility improvement," which 
in fact was a grant to AKH to purchase the building in AKH's name.386 Under a Memorandum Of 
Understanding accompanying the grant, NECC and AKH agreed to use the site for substance 
abuse treatment for 20 years, but DSAS retained no other rights or interest in the building387 and 
imposed no requirement concerning the clients the program must treat.388 
In addition to granting $264,000 to AKH to purchase the building, DSAS also 
agreed to reimburse NECC for rent paid to AKH at that site. DSAS agreed that AKH could lease 
the site to NECC at the building's "fair market value" as determined by appraisals obtained by 
NECC (which turned out to be about $20,700/month).389 That agreement again violated DSAS 
rules limiting reimbursement to the lower of fair market value or net cost (about 
384 Office of the State Comptroller Report No. 88-S-57, "Division of Substance Abuse Services, Oversight of Community-
Based Programs," p. 5. 
385 Id. 
386 Deming Tr. at 479. 
387 Memorandum of Understanding between DSAS, Natio~al Expert Care Consultants, Inc. and A. K. Holdings, Inc, signed 
April 30, 1987 and May 12, 1987. Apparendy, DSAS does not like to own real estate, and it is not unusual for the agency 
to provide partial funding for the acquisition of a site by a not-for-profit service provider. Armstrong Tr. at 894. 
388 Deming explained that DSAS has a responsibility to all substance abusers, including those belonging to the middle class, 
and therefore it is appropriate to finance a program that treats non-indigent clients. Deming Tr. at 398. 
389 Memorandum of Understanding between DSAS, National Expert Care Consultants, Inc. and A. K. Holdings, Inc, signed 
April 30, 1987 and May 12, 1987; Letter to Norwig Debye-Saxinger from Christine A. Storonsky, dated January 11, 1988, and 
accompanying Preliminary Draft Audit Findings of the Office of State Comptroller, p. 4; Appraisal by R. A. Sencer Associates, 
dated April 6, 1987. 
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$12,000/month).390 However, the lack of documentation makes it im{X)S.')ible to establish why 
DSAS agreed to pay the greater amount.391 ·-
The agreement under which DSAS reimbursed NECC for rent greater than AKH's 
mortgage cost also circumvented Mental Hygiene Law§ 25.03(a). That provision prohibits DSAS 
from paying more than half of the mortgage obligation incurred by a program in purchasing real 
estate. According to Deming, the formation of a separate entity to purchase property and lease it 
back to the service provider, so that DSAS is technically paying for "rent" rather than "debt 
service," is a common method of avoiding the Mental Hygiene Law's restriction.392 
In addition to the Memorandum of Understanding, AKH a_nd NECC entered into 
a side letter agreement, which DSAS considers a part of its contract with NECC and AKH. 393 
The letter agreement conditions AKH's promise to operate the property as a treatment facility for 
20 years upon continued DSAS funding for the cost of operations. 394 Therefore, once DSAS 
terminates funding for NECC ,, as it now has -- AKH can disregard its 20-year commitment. 
The letter agreement also provides that NECC's lease from AKH at 458 West 50th 
Street automatically terminates upon termination of DSAS funding for NECC:. 395 DSAS has the 
right to select a new service provider to lease the facility, but subject to the approval of AKH and 
the building's mortgage holder.396 Even if DSAS is unable to find a new provider that is satis-
factory to AKH, DSAS is still required to pay funds to AKH for operating expenses. 397 If a new 
390 DSAS Policy and Procedure Manual Service Providers, Item 3100.6. AKH's mongage and taxes on the property, which 
arguably constitute the net cost, were about $12,000/rnonth. RussakoffTr. at 277-80; ~also Letter to Norwig Debye-Saxinger 
from Christine A. Storonsky, dated January 11, 1988, and accompanying Preliminary Draft Audit Findings of the Office of State 
Comptroller, p. 4. 
391 How much DSAS actually reimbursed NECC for rent at 458 West 50th Street is also difficult to determine. A DSAS 
budget approved in July 1987 authorized $27,500/rnonth for the stan-up period February-March, 1987, while an August 1987 
request for reimbursement indicates that the program was authorized to receive and was paid $28,150/rnonth for April-August 
1987. An internal DSAS memorandum in December 1987 indicates that NECC was receiving $30,910/rnonth. See 
Memorandum to Carl Deming from Henry Banlett, dated December 24, 1987. A budget amendment in June 1988 reduced 
NECC's monthly rental for the April-August 1987 period to $22,550/rnonth. Russakoff testified that NECC was reimbursed at 
$18,500/month. Russakoff Tr. at 239. 
392 Deming Tr. at 507-08. 
393 Letter to National Expen Care Consultants, Inc. from A. K. Holdings, .Inc., dated May 15, 1987; Damm Tr. at 67. 





provider has not been selected after a year, AKH can cease using the property as a treatment 
facility upon repayment to the State of $264,000, without interest.398 
H. NECC's Cost And Performance 
The annual cost to DSAS ofNECC's residential program was about 
$33,000/bed,399 as compared to only about $6,000/bed in other residential programs operated by 
not-for-profit providers.400 DSAS justifies the higher cost on the ground that NECC was able to 
begin operations quickly, had a more professional staff, offered more intensive treatment, and 
rehabilitated clients more rapidly than other programs.401 However, contemporaneous DSAS 
documents raise doubts about DSAS' evaluation of the quality of the treatment program. 
By late 1986, Deming found that NECC had "active and ... serious problems," 
including substance abuse by program clients and staff; termination of program staff for "indis-
cretions" with clients; and poor management by the program's "highly degreed professionals."402 
Deming noted that "the place would have fallen apart" but for the work of one consultant. 403 A 
year later, in December 1987, Deming observed that NECC's cost per bed was too high and that 
"much work" was needed for NECC's service delivery to reach the level expected under the con-
tract.404 
Contract Management conducted a "Comprehensive Review" of the program and 
issued a report in February 1988. Among other things, the report noted that despite the rich 
staffing levels there was no documentation of any significant amount of individual counseling or 
398 !Q. 
399 Memorandum to Carl Deming from Henry Bartlett, dated December 24, 1987. The Comptroller's office calculated the 
cost per client at $27, 700, excluding NECC's profit. Office of the State Comptroller Report No. 88-S-57, "Division of Substance 
Abuse Services, Oversight of Community-Based Programs,• p. 3. 
400 Deming testified that, while there are variations among programs depending on factors such as the intensity of the 
services provided, a drug-free residential program such as Phoenix House today costs DSAS between $5,200 and $6,500 per 
bed. Deming Tr. at 342-43, The Comptroller's audit report noted two not-for-profit residential treatment programs that cost ·· 
$8,670 and $22,390 per client. Office of the State Comptroller Report No. 88-S-57, "Division-of Substance Abuse Services, 
Oversight of Community-Based Programs,• p. 3. 
401 ~~Armstrong Tr. at 750-54 ("we got our money's worth and ... yes, it was more expensive, but you can't compare 
apples and oranges"); Deming Tr. at 263 ("within a matter of three months, [NECC] actually got clients in, got the program 
running"). 
402 Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Carl Deming, dated January 8, 1987; Deming Tr. at 467. 
403 Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Carl Deming, dated January 8, 1987. 
404 Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Carl Deming, dated December 30, 1987. 
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individual participation in group sessions; client records "were gen~Fally prepared with a distinct 
lack of substantive staff/client interaction;" and services provided were generally not consistent 
with prescribed treatment plans. 405 
At the same time, NECC was extremely uncooperative with Contract 
Management. From the beginning, NECC began hiring staff without approval, paying salaries 
above approved budget levels, sub,contracting and taking other actions without authorization. 406 
Thus, in December 1986, Deming asked DSAS' Bureau of Field Audit and Program Review 
("F APR") to examine NECC, even though F APR does not usually conduct such a review until 
after a full year of operations. 407 
-In February 1987, F APR reported its findings, which included a number ~f 
problems in NECC's operations relating to the program's accounting policies and procedures, 
accounting records and practices, program expenditures and documentation thereof, and 
personnel record,keeping.408 However, NECC's compliance with DSAS requirements did not 
improve.409 For example, NECC never timely submitted its ''Workscope," the principal document 
describing the services that the program would deliver under each contract.410 When the 
"Workscopes" were eventually submitted, Contract Management found tht;!m "overly primitive, 
simplistic, unsophisticated and lacking in detail .... "411 
405 "Division of Substance Abuse Services Comprehensive Review of National Expert Care Consultants, Conducted by 
Contract Management and Fund Allocation," pp. iii, 11-12, 15. 
406 See, ~ Deming Tr. at 251-52; Ringer Tr. at 63-64; Memorandum to John Cavallaro from Martin Ringer, dated 
January 28, 1987. 
407 Deming Tr. at 250-52; Armstrong Tr. at 754-56. 
408 Memorandum to Julio Martinez, ~ fil., from Neil Grogin, dated February 2, 1987, and accompanying "Report on the 
Examination of National Expert Care Consultants," by New York State Division of Substance Abuse Services, Bureau of Field 
Audit and Program Review. 
409 Indeed, many of the problems noted in FAPR's report were noted again in Contract Management's Comprehensive 
Review report in February 1988. See "Division of Substance Abuse Services Comprehensive Review of National Expert Care 
Consultants, Conducted by Contract Management and Fund Allocation." 
4IO Deming Tr. at 474-76. 
411 Id. 
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NECC's paperwork had so many errors chat Contract Management staff spent 
inordinate time checking for accuracy and asking for explanations and corrections.412 Deming 
testified that some of the errors, which if undetected would have resulted in more money for the 
program, were implausible.413 One contract manager wrote that NECC "continues to demonstrate 
either a remarkable incompetence or a willful failure to understand DSAS requirements,"414 and 
many DSAS letters and memoranda expressed growing frustration with the program.415 NECC 
frequently failed to provide adequate responses to DSAS's many questions and requests for 
information.416 
Martin Ringer, the head of the regional office assigned to handle the NECC 
contracts, testified that he finally decided that every communication with Russakoff had to be in 
writing, and he told Russakoff that unless he could show written permission for an expenditure it 
would not be approved.417 Nevertheless, NECC continued to act without DSAS approval.418 
When questioned, Russakoff would explain that someone else had orally approved it.419 Upon 
checking, Contract Management staff frequently discovered that the action had not been 
approved. 420 
4l2 Ringer Tr. at 42. See, ~ Deming Tr. at 490-91; Letter to Roger Cohn from Llllian Milne, dated March 11, 1988; 
Letter to Don Russalcoff from Cynthia Bell and Martin Ringer, dated April 23, 1987; Memorandum to Carl Deming from John 
Cavallaro, dated January 26, 1987 ("an enormous amount of staff time ... has been given to this project with very little real 
results. No other project ... has had so much attention"); Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Carleton Deming dated 
January 8, 1987, p. 2 (Contract Management staff is •somewhat overwhelmed" by NECC, having "literally spent hours and hours• 
on the program; the time devoted to NECC "is severely out of line with the size of the project• and has been at the expense 
of other New York City treatment programs). 
413 Deming Tr. at 490-91. 
4!4 Memorandum to Carl Deming from Llllian Milne, dated March 15, 1988. 
4l5 See,~ Memorandum to Carl Deming from Llllian Milne, dated March 15, 1988; Letter to Roger Cohn from Martin 
Ringer, dated July 30, 1987; Memorandum to Carl Deming from Cynthia Bell and Martin Ringer, dated June 26, 1987. 
- -
416 ~~.Armstrong-Tr. at 691-92; Ringer-Tr. at 37, 39, 41, 63, 69-70; Bell Tr. at 13, 28; Letter to Roger Cohn from 
Llllian Milne, dated March 3, 1988 ("[i]t has been a consistent and habitual practice at National Expert Care Consultants to 
fail to respond to specific requests from the contract manager"). 
417 Ringer Tr. at 59, 60, 64-65. 
418 Jg. at 65. See, ~ Memorandum to Carl Deming from Martin Ringer and Llllian Milne, dated February 16, 1988 ("[i]t 
is becoming increasingly clear that NECC continues to hire staff without DSAS approval"). 
419 Ringer Tr. at 60, 64, 131. 
420 Jg. at 64, 13 l. 
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Finally, in early 1988, Contract Management conducted a review -::if the contracts 
·-and "disallowed" approximately $350,000 ofNECC's expenditures.421 DSAS recouped all but 
about $50,000 of that sum by withholding payments on a $1. 7 million contract for the period 
September 1987 to March 1988.422 
The State Comptroller also audited the NECC contracts, except for the September 
1987 , March 1988 contract, and uncovered nearly $547,000 in additional improper expenditures 
(on $2.6 million worth of contracts) that DSAS must recoup.423 
I. The Decision To Terminate NECC's Funding 
The combinadon of programmatic and financial problems and increasing a dverse 
publicity surrounding the NECC contracts prompted Deming, Armstrong and Debye,Saxinger to 
decide in early 1988 to cease funding NECC.424 For his part, Russakoff claims to have become 
frustrated with DSAS, principally due to the agency's delays in approving purchases and hiring.425 
In Spring 1988, DSAS began negotiating a three,month (April through June) 
"close,out" contract to end the agency's financial support for NECC.426 The purpose of the 
contract was to assist NECC in making an orderly transition from serving DSAS clients (i.e., 
indigent) to serving private, fee,paying clients.427 
DSAS knew at the time that the Comptroller had preliminarily found approxi, 
mately $500,000 in disallowances. Thus, the close-0ut contract was negotiated with the 
awareness that it would probably offset the disallowances and that, as a result, DSAS might pay 
421 Deming Tr. at 287-99. 
422 Id. at 285-305. 
423 Letter to Julio A. Martinez from Robert H. Attmore, dated April 11, 1989. The disallowed costs were associated with 
NECC employees and consultants who were hired without the required DSAS approval, and costs not related to the purpose 
of the programs, not properly supported, or in excess of approved budgets. DSAS toolc •no issue with the scope, content and 
findings" of the Comptroller's report. However, based on its own review, DSAS concluded that the total amount due DSAS 
was only $415,691. Letter to Robert H. Attmore from Julio A. Martinez, dated May 11, 1989, p. 2. 
424 Armstrong Tr. at 982-84; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 224; Deming Tr. at 334, 425-27. 
425 Russalcoff Tr. at 344-45. 
426 Deming Tr. at 301 , 324. 
427 !Q. at 301 , 327, 334-35. 
76 
little or nothing on the close-out contract.428 These circumstances create the impression that 
DSAS negotiated the contract so as to help Russakoff offset the disallowances, but Deming denied 
any such purpose. 429 
DSAS and NECC staff members negotiated the close-out contract until December 
1988 at which time it was forwarded to Russakoff.430 However, Russakoff never signed or returned 
the proposed contract and, after the Comptroller's Report was issued in April 1989, 
Debye-Saxinger decided to withdraw it.431 DSAS is now left to recoup from Russakoff its 
remaining disallowances and those identified by the Comptroller. As DSAS noted in its response 
to the Comptroller's audit ofNECC's contracts, "[s]ince NECC is no longer under contract to 
DSAS, the recovery cannot be accomplished in the normal fashion, i.e., through disallowances of 
future payments. Nevertheless, we plan to enter into negotiation with NECC officials to develop a 
repayment schedule for recovering the refund due the State."432 
J. Explanations Offered For The NECC Debacle 
None of the DSAS witnesses disputed that the NECC contracts were handled 
poorly. Each of them offered a different combination of the following reasons: (1) DSAS 
employees felt reluctant or powerless to take steps necessary to manage the contracts properly 
because they knew that Russakoff had direct access to Martinez; (2) Russakoff was difficult to deal 
with; (3) the Legislature, the Governor, Martinez and the agency wanted to make more treatment 
beds available as quickly as pos.sible to respond to the crack epidemic; (4) NECC was the first for-
profit provider DSAS had funded, and DSAS had no policy and procedures for such businesses; 
(5) Contract Management was overworked and overwhelmed by NECC and therefore 
mismanaged the contracts; and/or (6) Martinez was unaware of the problems with respect to 
NECC and was misled by his staff. A discussion of each follows. 
428 Id. at 305-06, 321, 323-24. 
- ..... 
429 !Q. at 320. See also Armstrong Tr. at 990-91. 
430 Armstrong Tr. at 995-96. The impression that DSAS sought to create an off-set for Russakofi's disallowances is 
enhanced by DSAS' failure, in calculating the amount of the close-out contract, to determine NECC's actual costs in carrying 
the remaining indigent clients. Instead, DSAS arbitrarily agreed to pay half the amount of NECC's monthly expenses, calculated 
on the assumption that NECC would have the same client and staffing levels as under previous contracts. However, by the 
time that the contract was forwarded to NECC in December 1988, DSAS knew that NECC actually had treated only half the 
number of clients as it had previously. Deming Tr. at 310-20. 
431 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 231; Deming Tr. at 31~; Armstrong Tr. at 991-92. 
432 Letter to Robert H. Attmore from Julio A. Martinez, dated May 11, 1989, p. 2. 
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1. Staff Reluctance To Intervene Because 
Of The Russakoff-Martinez Relationship ·-
Although Martinez played no role in negotiating the NECC contracts, his 
relationships with Russakoff and with Menken made it difficult for Contract Management staff to 
act objectively in dealing with NECC. 433 Armstrong himself withdrew from active involvement 
because of the relationships, and he testified that his absence partially accounts for the agency's 
failure to resolve some of the issues that arose during the course of the contracts. 434 
In addition, Russakoff often talked directly with Martinez and would tell contract 
managers that he had "already talked to Julid' about a matter.435 In fact, t~ere was frequent 
·· contact (i.e., twi~e a week)- between the two men until the end of 1986, when, according fo 
Armstrong, Martinez began to see Russakoff"as being very pesty, as wanting more and more of a 
piece of the action, in terms of lobbying, in terms of funding. "436 
Because of the frequent contact and name-dropping, some contract managers 
concluded that "ordinary day-to-day administration of the program" was meaningless because the 
program was ''being handled up above."437 Assuming that matters had been "pre-approved," they 
adopted an attitude of "I'll just process paper."438 -
According to Armstrong, Ringer felt tremendous pressure to keep NECC funded 
and LaPorte added to the pressure by urging Ringer to accommodate Russakoff.439 Ringer saw 
NECC as "greater than him, that it was at an upper level of the agency, and that he saw himself as 
a functionary of higher-ups. "440 Chief Counsel Damm similarly recalls that Ringer felt that if he 
433 Armstrong Tr. at 818-24, 1348, 1373-74, 1398. 
434 Id. at 847-50. 
435 IQ. at 819-20, 825-26, 1388-89. See also Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 103-04. Martinez surmised that given Russakoff's 
name-dropping tendencies, Russakoff probably did tell DSAS employees he had discus.5ed something with Martinez even when 
he had not. Martinez Tr. at 97-100. 
436 Armstrong Tr. at 1357-60. Martinez also got "feedback" that Russakoff was alienating people in Albany and not 
performing satisfactorily as a lobbyist. IQ. 
437 IQ. at 821 , 822-25, 836, 1370-71. 
438 IQ. See also Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 208-09. 
439 Armstrong Tr. at 824-30, 1045-47, 1365-66, 1389-90. 
440 IQ. at 824-25, 1368-69. 
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"raised too many questions" or "gave Don a hard time," then Rus.sakoff would talk to Martinez and 
Ringer would get "yelled at. "441 
Ringer testified that he was not aware of the extent or nature of the contact 
between Martinez and Russakoff and that the only pressure he felt stemmed from Martinez's 
"urgency to get residential beds up. "442 He also testified that while occasionally Russakoff told him 
that he had spoken to or would be seeing Martinez, this name-dropping created no added 
pressure.443 
2. Russakoff Was A Difficult Contractor 
Armstrong testified that Russakoff was such an uncooperative contractor that 
Contract Management's oversight capability was simply overtaxed.444 As already noted above, at 
pp. 7 4-7 5, he frequently hired staff and purchased equipment without DSAS' approval; he claimed 
to have received oral approval when in fact he had not; and paperwork was often submitted late 
and had to be returned because it was improperly or inadequately completed.445 Although 
Armstrong told Martinez that Contract Management staff were overextended, Martinez 
responded that "we have to do more to help Don.446 
3. Pressure To Increase Treatment Capacity 
The crack crisis in 1986 placed tremendous pressure on DSAS to establish more 
treatment beds.447 According to Armstrong, Martinez was so "consumed and driven" by the need 
to expand residential treatment that he would have responded favorably to anyone offering to 
open a facility quickly, and he simply failed to recognize the significance ofNECC's problems.448 
441 Damm Tr. at 59-60. See also Armstrong Tr. at 1371. 
442 -Ringer Tr. at 110, 1_14, 118, 122, 123. Ringer also denied having discussed NECC with LaPone. Id. at 147-48. 
443 !Q. at 133-37. 
444 Armstrong Tr. at 802-04, 1366-67, 1373. 
445 See!!!- at 1370, 1372. 
+46 Id. at 803. 
447 Ringer Tr. at 81-82, 118; Armstrong Tr. at 715-16, 717, 829, 1368-69, 1373. 
448 Armstrong Tr. at 716-17, 719, 811. 
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When Armstrong complained to Martinez about Russakoff or about Contract 
Management being overwhelmed by the program, Martinez's reply was "Russakoff has a building, 
we need space and we ought to give it a shot."449 Similarly, Armstrong told Martinez that rather 
than moving ahead with the second site at 458 West 50th Street, NECC should have been 
contained until the issues were resolved.450 However, Martinez responded that "we need beds."451 
4. NECC Was The First For .. Profit Provider 
Every DSAS witness identified the absence of a policy relating to contracting with a 
for-profit business as a primary source of the agency's problems with NECC.452 Although the need 
for a policy was recognized, none was ever developed. 453 As early as M~rch 1987, it was decided 
that Contract _Management should develop a policy for profit-making contractors, but ..-we didn't 
know how to begin and really what to do."454 As a result, it was the general consensus that the 
agency would develop the guidelines as the NECC contracts progressed. 455 
That approach was unrealistic and placed Contract Management staff in an 
impossible situation. Since Ringer's superiors gave him no specific instructions on how to deal with 
a for-profit entity or determine a reasonable profit factor, he would have liked to have moved more 
slowly with the program; yet, he was expected to keep the cash flow to NECC moving so that 
services could be provided. 456 
5. Contract Management Mismanaged The Contracts 
The combination of inadequate staff, pressure to expand treatment, and the sense 
that NECC was being handled by high level DSAS officials resulted in poor management of the 
449 !Q. at 723. 
450 !Q. at 809, 81 l. 
451 !Q. at 809, 1377. 
452 See, ~. !Q. at 1374. 
453 M· 
454 Damm Tr. at 40-44. 
455 Armstrong Tr. at 709-10, 747. 
456 Ringer Tr. at 118-22, 130, 151 -53. 
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contracts. According to Debye,Saxinger, "awfully shoddy, hurried work was being done by people 
who feel the director and his executive assistant want to move something quickly."457 
Contract Management staff agreed that the New York City regional office was 
inundated with work, and that NECC in particular created a tremendous drain on staff.458 Neither 
Armstrong nor Deming were able to give NECC the attention it demanded. 459 Both Ringer and 
contract manager Cynthia Bell devoted a substantial, but ultimately insufficient, amount of time to 
NECC's contracts because of their complexity, the fact that NECC was a new provider, and the 
problems identified above. 460 
6. Martinez: Unaware And Misled By His Staff 
Martinez testified that if he had known there had been problems with NECC, he 
would have told his staff, "if you people don't feel comfortable with it, phase the ... thing out, end 
it."461 He added that he would have expected Debye,Saxinger to resolve the issues raised by the 
FAPR review in late 1986 and early 1987, and that if there was disagreement among department 
heads Debye,Saxinger should have brought the issue to him for resolution.462 Martinez testified 
that he was "sandbagged" since Debye,Saxinger knew about the problems with NECC "from day 
one" but did not tell him.463 
Although Martinez testified that DSAS would not fund another for,profit 
contractor since the agency does not know how to handle them,464 he maintains that in 1986 
funding NECC was appropriate because there was a crack epidemic and Russakoff was "the only 
457 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 184-85. 
458 Armstrong Tr. at 824, 1366-67; Ringer Tr. at 42. 
459 Armstrong Tr. at 733-34; Deming Tr. at 254, 258. 
460 Ringer Tr. at 42; Bell Tr. at 15-16, 27-28. 
46l Martinez Tr. at 178. Armstrong testified that he kept Martinez apprised of problems with NECC and that during the 
Spring and Summer of 1986, he would discuss them with Martinez about once every two weeks. Armstrong Tr. at 713. 
Martinez does not recall these discussions. Martinez Tr. at 172-74. 
462 Martinez Tr. at 190-91, 193-94. 
463 !Q. at 157-58, 213-18, 225. 
464 Id. at 153-54. 
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game in town. He had a site .... "465 Thus, said Martinez, "I was able to take 40, 50 people off the 
·-
streets, rather than leaving them out there."466 
V. EL REGRESO 
A. Introduction And Summary 
El Regreso has been under contract with DSAS since July 1986 to provide drug, 
free residential treatment to 40 clients in Brooklyn, New York.467 Since its inception, DSAS has 
budgeted approximately $2,0l 5,000 for the program.468 As of March 1989, approximately 
$1,079,000 had been &;bursed.469 
However, El Regreso has yet to open a treatment facility, although it has operated a 
store,front counseling and referral service since June 1988. The delay appears mainly attributable 
to a series of problems in obtaining and renovating a building for the program. 
The decision to contract with El Regreso was made by Director Martinez and 
certain of his close associates who have long,standing close personal friendships with Carlos Pagan, 
El Regreso's Executive Director. El Regreso thus bypassed Contract Management and DSAS' 
usual contracting procedures. Moreover, the two principal contractors employed to help El 
Regreso in locating and renovating a site were selected in violation ofDSAS requirements. 
B. Carlos Pagan's Friendship With Director Martinez And Franklin Soto 
Pagan and Martinez have known each other for at least 20 years. They went 
through drug rehabilitation together in the 1960's.470 Together, they founded and worked at two 
drug treatment programs, Phoenix House and Project Return.471 When Martinez left Project 
465 !Q. at 113-14. 
466 !Q. at 154. 
467 Contract No. C001686 between DSAS and El Regreso Foundation, Inc., effective July 1, 1986 to June 30, 1987. 
468 DSAS - Commission on Government Integrity Data Request, DSAS Contract and Payment Information - El Regreso. 
469 !Q. 
470 Pagan Tr. at 49-50. 
471 !Q. 
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Return to become Director of DSAS, he picked Pagan to succeed him as president of the 
treatment program.472 As Pagan testified, "people in China know that we're friends."473 
Pagan is also gcxx:l friends with Franklin Soto, a close friend and assistant of 
Martinez.474 When Martinez is in New York City, the three of them socialize together.475 
C. DSAS' Decision To Fund El Regreso 
Pagan relied on these friendships in the Spring of 1986, when he approached DSAS 
about opening his own treatment program.476 He began discussions with members of Martinez's 
executive staff, Soto in particular, who at that time worked in DSAS' community relations 
office.477 Soto then ordered an inspection of Pagan's proposed site without Armstrong's know, 
ledge.478 Indeed, no one in Contract Management was informed of the project until much later. 
As early as April 1986, Armstrong overheard Soto and LaPorte discussing a 
program to be run by Pagan, yet neither Soto nor LaPorte mentioned it to Armstrong until he 
approached them in late May or early June.479 At that time, LaPorte and Soto told Armstrong 
that a commitment already had been made to Pagan. 480 Contract Management was completely cut 
out of the process.481 
472 Armstrong Tr. at 1195-96. 
473 Pagan Tr. at 49. 
414 .!Q. at 26, 66-67; Soto Tr. at 16, 20-22. 
415 Soto Tr. at 21. 
476 See Armstrong Tr. at 1193; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 247. 
477 Pagan Tr. at 11, 66-67. 
478 Armstrong Tr. ·at 1216-18. Armstrong first learned of Soto's action while giving private hearing testimony during this 
investigation; he was disturbed but not wholly surprised since Soto often carries out Martinez's directives personally. !Q. at 1218. 
479 ld. at 1192-93. 
480 !Q. Soto maintains that he only assisted Pagan in completing the application and, once he received it, forwarded it 
to Armstrong. Soto Tr. at 28. Pagan denies that he received any commitment from Soto or LaPorte, or that he received any 
assistance in completing the application. Pagan Tr. at 15, 18. Any such assistance normally should be provided by Contract 
Management staff. Armstrong Tr. at 1234-35. 
481 Armstrong Tr. at 1193-95. 
-. 83 
When Armstrong learned of the commitment, he approached Martinez, who 
confirmed that he and Pagan had discus.5ed the possibility of funding a program; Martinez 
explained his involvement by citing the need to develop residential beds.482 Faced with no choice 
but to proceed, Armstrong held a meeting with Pagan on June 9, 1986, in which he formally 
confirmed the agency's commitment to fund El Regreso.483 
D. Delays In The Opening Of El Regreso 
Apart from a storefront counseling and referral service begun in June 1988, 484 El 
Regreso has not yet begun operations. One reason appears to be a series of delays in obtaining a 
site for its proposed-residential treatment program. Between May 1986 a~d the end of that year, 
two possible sites fell through wfien landlords were unable to provide vacant buildings. 485- During 
-- . 
the first weeks of 1987, a third and apparently final program site was located on South Second 
Street, Brooklyn.486 Since then, problems in completing renovations at the site have caused addi-
tional delay. 
1. Site Selection And The Subcontract With NMA 
After El Regreso's first proposed site fell through in the Summer of 1986, the 
program signed a $20,000 subcontract with Don Russakoffs consulting firm, National 
Management Analysts ("NMA"), which was to assist El Regreso in finding a new site. 487 Although 
DSAS regulations require that consultant contracts be bid competitively and pre-approved in 
writing by the agency,488 this contract was entered into without any competitive process and was 
not approved by DSAS until more than a month after it was signed. 489 DSAS records contain no 
justification or explanation for this. 
482 !Q. at 1192-93. Martinez testified that he had no involvement in the decision to fund El Regreso: he simply told 
Pagan to complete the application and follow the normal routine. Martinez Tr. at 254-56. 
483 Armstrong Tr. at 1187. 
484 Letter to Doug Nelson from Jon Lushing, dated July 18, 1988. 
485 Memorandum to Dennis Whalen from John Cavallaro, dated December 11, 1986. 
486 Letter to William Griffin from Carlos Pagan, dated March 9, 1986. 
487 Contract Between El Regreso and National Management Analysts, Inc., dated August 27, 1986. 
488 DSAS Policy and Procedure Manual for Service Providers, Item 3100.22. 
489 Letter to Carlos Pagan from William Griffin, dated October 9, 1986. 
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A second subcontract for more than $12,000 was signed by El Regreso and NMA 
on January 1, 1987. 490 Once again, there was no competitive bidding, no approval by DSAS until 
many months after the fact,491 and no documentation explaining why DSAS rules were not 
followed.492 
Armstrong testified that either Soto or LaPorte must have suggested that Pagan 
hire Russakoff and essentially gave verbal approval to the subcontracts. 493 Pagan testified that it 
was his own idea to hire NMA and that he would never have done so without DSAS approval, 
but the documents do not support that sequence of events.494 
2. Renovations And The Contract With CMTC 
The current program site on South Second Street is now being renovated at ~n 
estimated cost of $559,000.495 El Regreso is not expected to be operational until Spring 1990, 
more than three years after the site was identified. 496 Armstrong attributes part of the delay to 
inefficiency by the construction manager hired by DSAS to oversee this and other projects. 497 
The construction manager, Construction Management Training Company 
("CMTC") was hired by DSAS without any competitive bidding. Armstrong testified that Debye~ 
Saxinger and Martinez wanted to preserve good relations with CMTC's-parent organization, the 
490 Contract Between El Regreso and National Management Analysis, Inc., dated January l, 1987. 
491 Letter to Carlos Pagan from Doug Nelson, dated August 3, 1987. 
492 Bill Griffin, the contract manager assigned to El Regreso, has no recollection of the events surrounding these contracts. 
Griffin Tr. at 211-14. However, when questioned on this subject, Griffin recalled that in mid-1987 Carl Deming told him that 
a decision had been made to disapprove future contracts with NMA. !Q. at 202-06. Although Deming confirmed such a· 
decision (Deming Tr. at 433), it is not documented ahd neither Armstrong nor Debye-Saxinger could recall it. Armstrong Tr. 
at 1296; Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 297-98. 
493 Armstrong Tr. at 1256-57. 
494 Pagan Tr. at 29-31; ~above, fn. 489 and fn. 491. 
495 Memorandum to Carl Deming from William Griffin, dated April 13, 1987. 
496 Griffin Tr. at 261. 
497 Armstrong Tr. at 1283. 
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Urban Coalition, and that therefore they contracted with CMTC to offset the termination of 
another DSAS contract with the Urban Coalition for organizing coriterences. 498 
The use of CMTC on the El Regreso project also served another purpose. DSAS 
had received inquiries from a reporter and a lawyer about the close relationship between Martinez 
and Pagan and, in a memorandum summarizing a meeting with Pagan, the contract manager 
handling El Regreso wrote: "Carlos [Pagan] was assured that, although there are no known 
improprieties involved, the fact the Urban Coalition CMTC (an uninvolved third party) is 
handling contracts further distances Carlos and DSAS from any erroneous appearances of 
sweetheart deals. "499 
Armstrong and·Griffin testified that using CMTC may have helped avoid the 
appearance of impropriety because Pagan, if left to his own devices, would have hired NMA to be 
the construction manager.500 Ifhe had done so, DSAS might have been vulnerable to clai~ that 
Pagan was being given unfettered discretion to spend money and hire friends of Director 
Martinez.501 
E. El Regreso's Staff 
Since DSAS funding began, Pagan has been paid $40,000 annually.502 However, 
Pagan may have been paid full-time wages for only part-time work; similar salaries have been paid 
to directors of fully operational programs.so3 
498 !Q.. at 1274-81. Debye-Saxinger testified it was merely coincidence that CMTC was hired at the same time DSAS 
. stopped using the Urban Coalition to organize its conferences, but did not deny that the CMTC contract was not competitively 
bid. Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 282-89. Martinez testified he did not know about the CMTC contract until after its execution. 
Martinez Tr. at 336. 
499 Memorandum to File from Doug Nelson, dated October 16, 1987. 
500 Armstrong Tr. at 1281-82, 1292-93; Griffin Tr. at 189-190, 223-24, 228. Pagan testified he had intended to oversee 
the renovations himself, and denied wanting to hire NMA. Pagan Tr. at 39-41. 
SOI Armstrong Tr. at 1292-93; Griffin Tr. at 223-24, 228. 
502 Griffin Tr. at 237; DSAS Repon to N.Y.S. Inspector General Joseph A. Spinelli, dated October 7, 1988 (Pan B, "El 
Regreso Foundation, Inc."). 
503 See Armstrong Tr. at 1305; Deming Tr. at 569-73. See also Memorandum to Carleton Deming from William J. Griffin, 
dated January 5, 1988 (the salary for Rafael Cantellops as the director of a combined day service program (serving 40 clients) 
and residential program (serving 72 clients) "should not exceed $50,000"). 
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At the outset, Pagan's duties included activities such as locating a site and meeting 
with community officials, legislators and architects.s04 However, the contract manager responsible 
for El Regreso had doubts that those activities kept Pagan fully engaged. sos Once Pagan found and 
secured the current program site in early 1987, his duties diminished. 
Still more questionable is the program's need for three employees (in addition to 
Pagan) since January 1987, and a fourth one after El Regreso opened its storefront counseling and 
referral center in June 1988. 506 The program received DSAS' written approval for each new 
position, but no DSAS records contain an evaluation or explanation of the need for the additional 
staff. 
Although Martinez and the program's contract manager deny it,so7 El Regreso's 
storefront center appears overstaffed. The program's records indicate that, on average, Pagan and 
his four employees make one referral each day.s08 Two employees, a "Fiscal Officer" and a "Special 
Assistant," are paid full-time salaries to write checks for such matters as utility and insurance 
bills.s09 
F. El Regreso's Future 
The prognosis for El Regreso is unclear and Armstrong and Debye-Saxinger 
disagree on the subject. Armstrong believes that Pagan is an honest man with a sincere desire and 
the ability to open and operate a treatment facility.s 10 He believes the successive site problems 
were merely misfortune and that El Regreso will ultimately open. 
S04 Memorandum to Gerard Armstrong from Bill Griffin, dated October 6, 1988; Armstrong Tr. at 1300. 
SOS Griffin Tr. at 254-58. 
S06 DSAS Report to N.Y.S. Inspector General Joseph A. Spinelli, dated October 7, 1988 (Part B, "El Regreso Foundation, 
Inc.,• personnel rosters). The report to the Inspec-tor General includes employment rosters showing an "Executive Director,• 
an •Administrative Assistant,• a "Fiscal Officer," and a "Special Assistant" receiving full-time salaries as of January 1987, and 
a full-time "Secretary" as of June 1988. !Q. See also Lener to Carlos Pagan from Doug Nelson, dated February 2, 1987; Lener 
to Doug Nelson from Jon Lushing, dated June 2, 1988; Lener to Doug Nelson from Carlos Pagan, dated August 1, 1988. 
S07 Martinez Tr. at 340-42; Griffin Tr. at 262-64. 
SOB "El Regreso's Clients Serviced, June 16, 1988 to Present," as submitted to DSAS on December 21, 1988. 
S09 Pagan Tr. at 54-56. 
S10 Armstrong Tr. at 1199. 
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On the other hand, Debye-Saxinger, in addition to objecting to the original 
decision to fund El Regreso, questions Pagan's ability to start and ru~-a new program 
successfully.511 
* * * 
The facts set forth above concerning DSAS' procedures and the contracts with the 
four programs investigated in depth by the Commission provide ample support for the conclusions 
and recommendations set forth in_ Part One of this report: 
Dated: New York, New York 
December, 1989 
511 Debye-Saxinger Tr. at 266-67, 280. 
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GLOSSARY OF INDIVIDUALS 
DSAS Deputy Director for Contract Management and Fund Allocation. 
Head of DSAS' Third Party Reimbursement Unit within the Bureau of 
Contract Management and Fund Allocation. 
DSAS Contract Manager. 
Founder and Executive Director of La N ueva Raza Institute. 
DSAS Chief Counsel. 










DSAS Downstate Chief of Contract Management. Deming is 
responsible for programs in New York City and Nassau and Suffolk 
Counties. 
Businessman, entrepreneur and Prospect., Inc. 's chief financial strategist 
and sponsor. 
Executive Director of Prospect, Inc. and former Administrator of 
Prospect Hospital. 
Former Chairman of the Board of La N ueva Raza Institute. 
·DSAS Contract Manager. _ 
DSAS Deputy Director for Field Audit and Program Review. 
DSAS Contract Manager. 
DSAS Deputy Director for Chemotherapy Services. 
Director of DSAS. 
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